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This study explores the often-posited distinction between Alexandrian and Cappadocian 
approaches to deification in the fourth and fifth centuries. Athanasius of Alexandria has 
been selected to represent an Alexandrian approach and Gregory of Nazianzus, to represent 
a Cappadocian one. Comparison of their respective theologies of deification reveals a 
diversity in opinion on what exactly deification involved among the Fathers and the 
inadequacy of the interpretive categories of “moral” and “realistic” approaches to 
distinguish between them. The study observes areas of convergence and divergence at each 
stage of their respective narratives of deification, beginning with Creation and the Fall; then 
the Redemptive work of Christ; Pneumatology and Baptism; the Christian life, and finally the 
Deified State. What should become apparent throughout this study is that while both 
Fathers are espousing ideas which should rightfully be considered deification, the substance 
of their ideas and their focuses differ dramatically in places and while they are not 
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Given that the term ‘deification’ escapes formal definition until the Sixth Century, it is 
unsurprising that turning to the Fourth Century Fathers we do not discover one consistent, 
uniform doctrine. Alexandrian deification has often been painted as a distinct approach to 
Cappadocian deification, reinforced by Norman Russell declaring the former a realistic 
approach and the latter a moral one.1 Considering the concept of deification in Athanasius 
of Alexandria, our Alexandrian representative, and Gregory of Nazianzus, our Cappadocian 
representative, we shall determine whether this distinction is genuine and whether the 
realistic and moral designations are useful categories for articulating this distinction. 
Through our study it should become apparent that there are striking similarities between 
the theories of Athanasius and Gregory, but also significant differences. Both theories 
should be considered under the umbrella of deification, but there is a need to differentiate 
between them to make clear that these Fathers are not espousing identical soteriologies. 
However, the ‘realistic’ and ‘moral’ labels should certainly not be the means of doing so. 
Athanasius and Gregory were chosen carefully as the subjects of this study. Athanasius was 
chosen over Cyril of Alexandria, since Cyril is often thought to have incorporated aspects of 
the Cappadocian approach into his theology.2 Gregory of Nazianzus was chosen over Basil of 
Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa since he speaks more frequently of deification than his 
fellow Cappadocians.3 Additionally, they proved suitable subjects as Christopher Beeley has 
convincingly demonstrated that Gregory did not have the knowledge of Athanasius’ works 
once thought. While Gregory’s Oration 21 suggests a close connection to Athanasius, Beeley 
argues “the success of Gregory's persuasive abilities in this oration has tended to exaggerate 
the real nature of his relationship to Athanasius”.4 He concludes “Gregory's acquaintance 
with Athanasius’ work is sparse, and what little he knows does not inform his own work to 
any great extent”.5 While Volker Henning Drecoll believes Gregory may have had knowledge 
of a few more Athanasian texts than Beeley suggests, ultimately he agrees “the sceptical 
 
1 Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 9. 
2 Christopher Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God: In Your Light We Shall See 
Light (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 322. 
3 Russell, Doctrine, 232. 
4 Beeley, Gregory, 160. 
5 Beeley, Gregory, 161. 
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approach of Beeley is right here”.6 Oliver Langworthy likewise concurs, explaining “Although 
Athanasius is consciously acknowledged as a predecessor, little evidence, whether textual or 
epistolary, exists to support a direct relation”.7 With Athanasius and Gregory, we have two 
Fathers unfamiliar with each other’s work, allowing us to identify similarities within their 
theories of deification without concern that they are merely Gregory borrowing from 
Athanasius. 
Russell uses the concepts of realistic and moral deification as an interpretative framework 
for his study of Greek Patristic theories of deification. He explains, 
“The ethical approach takes deification to be the attainment of likeness to God 
through ascetic and philosophical endeavour, believers reproducing some of the 
divine attributes in their own lives by imitation. Behind this use of the metaphor lies 
the model of homoiosis, or attaining likeness to God. The realistic approach assumes 
that human beings are in some sense transformed by deification. Behind the latter 
use lies the model of methexis, or participation, in God”.8 
Russell claims “the realistic is especially characteristic of the Alexandrian tradition, the 
ethical of the Cappadocian”.9 Russell considers Athanasius’ deification realistic meaning it 
understands humans to be transformed into gods in a realistic sense. Gregory’s deification is 
classed as moral, meaning it focuses on believers becoming like God through moral living 
and imitation, but not a realistic transformation. Russell’s categorisation of Gregory seems 
outright wrong, as has been observed by several scholars, and, as Daniel Keating notes, 
contradicts his own work which “shows that Nazianzen identifies the incarnation of Christ 
‘as the basis of a deification in the realistic sense’”.10 His categorisation of Athanasius is 
perhaps more accurate, but neglects the significant moral element to Athanasius’ 
deification. While one can entirely sympathise with the desire to distinguish between the 
two theories of deification, the concept of realistic and moral approaches is not the means 
to do so. 
 
6 Volker Henning Drecoll, “Remarks on Christopher Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the 
Knowledge of God. In Your Light We Shall See Light”, Scottish Journal of Theology 64, no. 4 (2011), 464. 
7 Oliver Langworthy, Gregory of Nazianzus' Soteriological Pneumatology (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2019), 27. 
8 Russell, Doctrine, 2. 
9 Russell, Doctrine, 9. 
10 Daniel Keating, “Typologies of Deification”, International Journal of Systematic Theology 17, No. 3 (July 
2015), 270; See Beeley, Gregory, 119. 




Since neither Father wrote a specific work on the topic of deification, this study will collect 
the numerous relevant threads scattered throughout their works and attempt to weave 
them into systems which we can compare. At each stage of their respective deification 
narratives, we will consider the areas of convergence and divergence, beginning with 
Creation and the Fall; then the Redemptive work of Christ; Pneumatology and Baptism; the 
Christian life, and finally the Deified State. Both Fathers are credited with the invention of 
terms which are both rendered ‘deification’ in English. Athanasius coins the term 
θεοποίησις from the verb θεοπoίεω and Gregory invents the term θέωσις from his favoured 
verb, θεόω.11 This is useful for comparison and we will henceforth refer to Athanasius’ 
theory of deification as theopoiēsis and Gregory’s as theōsis. Through noting the similarities 
and differences, and the reasons for them, it should become apparent that while both 
Fathers are espousing concepts which should rightfully be considered deification, their 
focuses and ideas radically differ and while perhaps synthesisable, these theories of 
deification are far from identical.  
 
11 Vladimir Kharlamov, "Rhetorical Application of Theosis in Greek Patristic Theology", in Partakers of the 
Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, ed. Michael Christensen 
and Jeffery Wittung (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2008), 117; Russell, Doctrine, 167. 
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Chapter 1: Creation and the Fall 
To understand theopoiēsis and theōsis one must first consider Athanasius’ and Gregory’s 
doctrines of Creation and the Fall. The anthropology of both Fathers is crucial to their 
concepts of deification. Furthermore, since both Fathers consider deification a soteriological 
process, it is key to identify from what they deem humanity to be in need of saving. While 
there are areas of convergence, our Fathers tend to have different focuses, particularly 
regarding the nature of humanity and the causes of the Fall. Thus, unsurprisingly, we begin 
at the beginning. 
Athanasius 
Creation 
The most fundamental aspect of Athanasius’ ontology is the absolute divide between God 
who is being and everything created which depends entirely on him for continued existence. 
In the beginning, “God who IS” (DI 4.5) creates the universe ex nihilo. For Athanasius this 
means all created things naturally tend towards returning to a state of non-existence. He 
explains “For the nature of created things, inasmuch as it is brought into being out of 
nothing, is of a fleeting sort, and weak and mortal, if composed of itself only” (CG 41.2). M. 
C. Steenberg claims “Athanasius shares this view with his predecessors, going back […] at 
least as far as Irenaeus”.12 To counteract, what Khalad Anatolios calls, this “ontological 
poverty”, God creates “the universe to exist through His Word” (DI 3.1), giving it 
“substantive existence” (CG 41.3).13 This act of creation through the Word is not a singular 
event, but rather continuously creation “partakes of the Word […] and is helped by Him so 
as to exist, lest that should come to it which would have come but for the maintenance of it 
by the Word, — namely, dissolution” (CG 41.3). All things are graciously created by God and 
continuously depend on him for existence. A frequent topic throughout Athanasius’ writings 
is, what Andrew Louth deems, the “complete contrast between God and the created order, 
between the uncreated and self-subsistent and that which is created out of nothing by the 
 
12 M.C. Steenberg, Of God and Man Theology as Anthropology from Irenaeus to Athanasius (London: T&T Clark, 
2009), 164. 
13 Khaled Anatolios, Athanasius the Coherence of His Thought (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), 164. 
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will of God”.14 For Athanasius, all that belongs to the creative order is ontologically the same 
and distinct from God in that it is continuously dependent upon his grace to exist. 
Humanity experiences the same ontological deficiency as the rest of creation, entirely 
dependent on participation in the “God who IS” (DI 3.1) to exist. However, unlike the rest of 
creation, God did not “barely create” (DI 3.3) humans, but rather “made them after His own 
image, giving them a portion even of the power of His own Word” (DI 3.3), so that “by 
reason of [our] likeness of Him that is (and if [we] still preserved this likeness by keeping 
Him in his knowledge) [we] would stay [our] natural corruption, and remain incorrupt” (DI 
4.6). Anatolios has aptly described this as Athanasius’ “doctrine of the ‘second grace’ by 
which humanity is made in the image of God”.15 At the beginning humanity was given a 
second grace, the grace of being made in the image, which entailed a greater participation 
in the Logos, granting it a more secure existence and immortality. Importantly, as Louth 
notes, “Man's being in the image of God is not part of his creaturely endowment, but a 
grace given him by God to enable him to participate in the Word”.16 Naturally humans are 
creatures with inherently unstable being, tending towards nothingness. It is only by grace 
that they can exist and only by this second grace that they are made immortal; this is not 
their natural condition. Humanity is, for Athanasius, “a natural recipient of grace” (CA 1.45). 
Humans are fundamentally creatures and though somewhat more privileged than the rest 
of creation, this is not due to their nature, but rather the additional grace granted them, 
that is a greater participation in the Word. 
Had humanity not fallen they would have remained incorruptible in paradise. The purpose 
of this second grace was that humanity “might rejoice and have fellowship with the Deity, 
living the life of immortality unharmed and truly blessed” (CG 2.2). However, this grace was 
contingent upon humanity’s preservation of it. Athanasius explains “if they kept the grace 
and remained good, they might still keep the life in paradise without sorrow or pain or care” 
(DI 3.3). The keeping of this grace of being in the image of God entails first remaining good 
and secondly, preserving “this likeness by keeping Him in his knowledge” (DI 4.6). Since this 
 
14 Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 74. 
15 Khaled Anatolios, “The Soteriological Significance of Christ’s Humanity in St Athanasius”, St Vladimir’s 
Theological Quarterly 40, no. 4 (1996), 274. 
16 Andrew Louth, “Athanasius’ Understanding of the Humanity of Christ”, in Studia Patristica XVI, ed. Elizabeth 
Livingstone (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1985), 313. 
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grace is not humanity’s by nature, but rather something given to it, the grace can be lost. 
Athanasius recognises the “case of Adam” as the supreme example of this principle and the 
foundation of his dictum, what “mere man receives, he is liable to lose again” (DI 3.38). Had 
humanity never fallen, they would have remained in this state of incorruption, living forever 
in contemplation of and fellowship with God, but since this state was not humanity’s by 
nature it was a state from which they could fall. While this state shares much with the 
deified state wrought by Christ’s saving work and Athanasius considers this work to be in 
part a restoration of the Edenic state, he does not suggest at this stage humanity is deified 
or considered gods. Theopoiēsis entails more than a mere restoration of humanity’s Edenic 
condition. 
The Fall 
Humanity was liable to lose the second grace and indeed it did. Regarding the Fall, 
Athanasius does not focus upon the Tree, though occasionally mentions the Devil’s 
involvement.17 He explains humans “making light of better things, and holding back from 
apprehending them, began to seek in preference things nearer to themselves […] But nearer 
to themselves were the body and its senses […] they fell into lust of themselves, preferring 
what was their own to the contemplation of what belonged to God” (CG 3.1-3.2). The Fall is 
characterised as a turning towards creation away from contemplation of God. Steenberg 
suggests “Rather than something ontological, sin is defined as a movement, held in 
opposition to stability, or ‘remaining’, in the contemplation of (and participation in) God”.18 
While the Tree is not absent from Athanasius’ writings, he understands the Fall primarily as 
the gradual act of turning away from God not a single event. Humanity falls by forming 
desires for material things and becoming “habituated to these desires” (CG 3.4), 
consequently becoming “enslaved to sin; and, ever sinning” (CA 2.68). We find in Athanasius 
a principle which Thomas Weinandy notes finds its “supreme echo […] in Augustine”, that 
“good is, while evil is not” (CG 4.4).19 Athanasius states evil has no “substantive existence; 
but that men, in default of the vision of good, began to devise and imagine for themselves 
what was not, after their own pleasure” (CG 7.3). Turning away from God naturally entails 
 
17 See DI 5.1, “But men, having rejected things eternal, and, by counsel of the devil, turned to the things of 
corruption”. 
18 Steenberg, Of God, 174. 
19 Thomas Weinandy, Athanasius: A Theological Introduction (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), 18. 
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turning to evil, for it is the turning away from that which is to that which is not. The Fall, in 
Athanasius’ theology, was not a singular event, but humanity’s progressive turning away 
from God and good (which “has its pattern in God Who is” (CG 4.4)), towards themselves 
and evil which possess no real existence. 
The consequences of the Fall are, for Athanasius, the loss of the second grace and the return 
of humanity to its natural state. Louth explains “man has sinned and fallen, his being κατ' 
εἰκόνα θεου is lost or disappearing, and he is subject to φθορά and θάνατος”.20 The grace of 
being in the image is lost as humanity tarnishes the image, covering it with “the filth of sin” 
(CG 34.3). Furthermore, they became “habituated to” sin (CG 3.4). This “was turning them 
back to their natural state” (DI 4.4). While through grace humanity enjoyed stable existence 
with God, bereft of this grace they returned to their natural state, that of all created beings, 
that of corruption and tending towards the nothingness from which they came. Steenberg 
suggests as contemplation of God who is drew humanity into participation of his attributes, 
namely existence, so “contemplation of finite realities implies an ever greater participation 
in all the attributes of that finitude, namely corruption and death”.21 However, this does not 
particularly capture Athanasius’ thought, which considers corruption an attribute which is 
natural to humanity and not caused by participation in something other than God, but 
simply by not participating in God. The grace of participating in God is not replaced by 
something else, but is just lost, returning humanity to what it would have been without the 
grace. Louth explains “the corruption consequent on the fall is not as it were a mere staining 
of man's nature — such as could be cleaned. The corruption consequent upon the fall 
reveals the true nature of man as he is in himself, on his own, apart from God: created out 
of nothing, fragile, impermanent”.22 Fallen humanity is left bereft of the second grace, 
facing the same fate as all other created beings: a return to the nothingness from which it 
was created, having turned from participation in God.  
In his anthropology, Athanasius does not tend to divide the body and soul in humans. Louth 
notes that, as explained above, “the doctrine of creation ex nihilo implies that the most 
fundamental ontological divide is between God and the created order, to which latter both 
 
20 Louth, “Athanasius’ Understanding”, 312. 
21 Steenberg, Of God, 174-175. 
22 Louth, “Athanasius’ Understanding”, 314. 
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soul and body belong”.23 Created by God, the body and soul are both subject to the same 
ontological poverty as the rest of creation once bereft of the second grace. Consequently, 
Louth observes, “The soul has nothing in common with God; there is no kinship between it 
and the divine. Its kinship is with its body, in virtue of their common creation, rather than 
with God”.24 Athanasius does not concern himself with the nature of the soul and body 
separately, usually focusing upon the human as the object, composed of both. While he 
uses the term ἄνθρωπος, he commonly refers to the whole human as σάρξ in line with its 
scriptural usage.25 This reflects Athanasius’ view of humanity as fundamentally earthly and 
created, distinct from God. This is a common theme in Athanasius who stresses that humans 
are principally “from the earth” (CA 3.19). In Athanasius’ concept of the Imago Dei, the soul 
is “a mirror” (CG 34.3) and in this way it is a “reflexion of the Word” (DI 3.3). Louth explains 
this metaphor “suggests that there is a real similarity between the soul and God […] But it 
does this without suggesting that there is a natural kinship between the soul and God. There 
is no ontological continuity between the image in the mirror and that of which it is the 
image”.26 The “filth of sin” (CG 34.3) covers the soul, preventing it from reflecting God and 
thus the grace of being in the image is lost. Louth notes “On this understanding, theopoiesis, 
divinization, will not mean the rediscovery of any kinship between the soul and God, but 
rather that, as it is purified, the soul more accurately reflects the image of God”.27 This 
maintains the Athanasian divide between the uncreated God and creation which is wholly 
other than him. The whole human, body and soul, belongs to the latter category. 
Summary 
Athanasius carefully divides God from all creation which perpetually depends on him for 
existence. Humanity, given the grace of the imago Dei, enjoyed a more stable existence 
than the rest of creation, but turning from God towards created things with no real 
existence they dirtied their souls so they no longer reflected God. Bereft of this second 
grace they returned to their natural state of corruption tending towards the nothingness 
from which they were created. 
 
23 Louth, Origins, 75. 
24 Louth, Origins, 75.  
25 See CA 3.30, “for ‘the Word,’ as John says, ‘became flesh’ (it being the custom of Scripture to call man by the 
name of ‘flesh’”. 
26 Louth, Origins, 77-78. 
27 Louth, Origins, 78. 





Gregory’s account of creation differs from Athanasius’. Athanasius’ grouping of creation as 
one unit, wholly distinct from God is replaced in Gregory by a three-tiered understanding of 
creation. God creates, for Gregory, through an overflow of his goodness. He explains “it was 
not sufficient for goodness to be moved only in contemplation of itself, but it was necessary 
that the good be poured forth and spread outward, so that there would be more recipients 
of its benevolent activity” (Or. 38.9). God “first thought of the angelic and heavenly powers, 
and the thought was action, […] thus were created the second radiance, the servants of the 
first Radiance” (Or. 38.9). Gregory’s interest in the Angelic realm is not present in 
Athanasius. He describes this realm as “akin to” God (Or. 38.10). Following this, God creates 
“a second material and visible world”, one which is “entirely foreign to him” (Or. 38.10). 
Contrary to the Athanasian divide between all creation and God, Gregory claims “intelligible 
natures and those apprehended only by the mind are akin to the divine, but those 
apprehended by the senses are entirely foreign to it” (Or. 38.10). God is, for Gregory, “the 
great mind” (Carm 1.2.12, 8). Thus, the first realm is like him in that it is spiritual and 
intellectual, whereas the second is physical and wholly unlike him. Gregory suggests God’s 
greatness is more fully demonstrated in his creation of that which is wholly other than 
himself. While Athanasius focuses on the divide between the uncreated and created, in 
which God falls in the former and creation in the latter, Gregory stresses the divide between 
the spiritual and physical, the first including God and spiritual things and the second that 
which is material. Gregory does also recognise the divide between God and creation, 
explaining there are two veils: “The first veil separates the heavenly and angelic realm from 
the Godhead, and the second, our world from that of the heavens” (Or. 6.22). However, he 
is far more concerned with the second veil than the first. 
Humanity, the third part of creation, was created after the heavenly and earthly realms. 
Humanity, for Gregory, is where the two previous worlds meet. Humans are “a blending out 
of both, […] a mixing of opposites” (Or. 39.11), for we “are twofold […] composed of soul 
and body, and our nature is visible yet also invisible” (Or. 40.8). Gregory describes how 
“having taken the body from the matter already created, [God] breathed in breath from 
himself, which is surely the intelligent soul and the image of God of which Scripture speaks” 
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(Or. 38.11). No longer do the spiritual and physical realms separately manifest God’s 
greatness, but now also through humanity, a mixture of both. Interested in the division of 
spiritual and physical realms, Gregory, unlike Athanasius, gives great attention to the 
relationship between the spiritual (higher) and physical (lower) elements of humanity: the 
soul and body. Donald Winslow notes while our bodies come from the physical realm, “our 
higher (noetic, spiritual) nature comes to us, not from the invisible creation of the angelic 
cosmos, but directly from the Creator-Word”, as Gregory explains, “The body was fashioned 
down here, while soul, again is a breath of the great Mind [nous]” (Carm. 1.2.12, 8).28 
Gregory’s concept of God as the Great nous is vital for understanding human-divine 
relations and it is our minds which he considers to be in the image of God (Brian Matz notes, 
eikōn theou appears “thirty-two times, nineteen of which refer to ‘mind’ while the others 
refer to Christ” in Gregory’s corpus).29 While in Athanasius humanity is in nature entirely 
other than God, Gregory stresses humanity’s natural kinship with God in the nous which is 
the image of God and comes from him, the Great Nous. For this reason, from the beginning 
Gregory considers humanity in some sense divine, describing us as “the divine-terrestrial 
creature” (Carm. 1.2.1, 100) and “earth mixed with divinity” (Carm. 1.1.4, 91-92). 
Gregory recognises several reasons for humanity’s twofold nature. The first is that they 
“may inherit the glory above by means of a struggle and wrestling with things below, being 
tried as gold in the fire by things here, and gain the objects of our hope as a prize of virtue, 
and not merely as the gift of God” (Or. 2.17).  Humanity’s heavenly destiny is not just given 
to them, but is earnt as a “prize”. Gregory understands “the dust” to be “the inferior 
element in us” and “the spirit” to be “the better” (Or. 27.7). The spiritual draws us to God, 
while the physical draws us to the material world and thus we struggle to not “debase 
ourselves when our origins are lofty” and “cling to the visible realm” (Or. 19.6), but rather 
turn towards God and live virtuously to earn heaven as our reward. Connected to this is 
Gregory’s concept of free will. This gift enables us to “make the good even our own, not 
only because [it is] sown in our nature, but because [it is] cultivated by our own choice, and 
by the motions of our will, free to act in either direction” (Or. 2.17). To complement this 
 
28 Donald F. Winslow, The Dynamics of Salvation: A study in Gregory of Nazianzus (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Philadelphia Patristic Foundation Ltd., 1979), 51. See also Or. 38.11. 
29 Brian Matz, “Gregory of Nazianzus”, in A History of Mind and Body in Late Antiquity, ed. Anna Marmodoro 
and Sophie Cartwright (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 313. 
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“God gave him a law as material on which his self-determination could work, and the law 
was a commandment indicating which plants he could possess and which one he was not to 
touch” (Or. 38.12), so that “we might be of good repute by keeping it” (Or. 45.28). 
Humanity’s original destiny involved their growing in goodness and virtue as their spiritual 
nature struggled with the earthly to look towards God and not the physical and choosing, 
through free will, to pursue good by keeping the commandment. It is in this way that 
Gregory understands earthly life as “training” (Or. 16.15) and “education for the soul” (Or. 
45.28). 
Additionally, Gregory understands the body to be a means of keeping humanity humble. He 
explains a purpose of our “hybrid nature” is that “whenever we feel exalted because of our 
likeness to God’s image, we may be brought down because of our clay” (Or. 14.7). 
Elsewhere he suggests the soul is embodied that “he might suffer and in suffering 
remember and be corrected if he has ambition for greatness” (Or. 38.11). Gregory sees in 
humanity a serious risk of pride on account of its divine element, which God seeks to 
counter through the soul’s embodiment. We shall see this pride contributes to humanity’s 
fall. Additionally, Nonna Verna Harrison notes the “body is precisely the means through 
which [the human] acts in the world to practice virtue and to be of service”.30 Gregory 
writes “God has provided every member [of the body] as good, to do good things”, 
explaining “the hands’ best work is to lift up always to heaven holy things, in readiness to 
practice heaven’s laws. For the feet, it’s to walk a straight road, not on thorns, neither along 
sea-scapes and an unholy path” (Carm. 2.1.45, 55-59). It is often assumed Gregory, 
influenced by Platonism, considered the body as something fundamentally evil from which 
the soul should seek to escape, yet in reality Gregory understands the body an essential 
aspect of the human person which aids the soul in its pursuit of heaven. Thus, while Gregory 
calls his body “my enemy” (Or. 14.6) on account of its drawing him towards physical things 
rather than God, he understands this to be part of its purpose in helping him grow in virtue 
and earn heaven. Thus, he also considers the body his “yokefellow” (Or. 16.15) his “fellow-
servant” and “the helper I need to achieve my noble aims” (Or. 14.6).  He also bestows 
these titles upon the body, because through it he acts and “it is through my actions that I 
 
30 Nonna Verna Harrison, Festal Orations: St Gregory Nazianzus (New York: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2008), 
49. 
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am to ascend to God” (Or. 14.6). While occasionally Gregory seems to espouse a more 
Platonic desire to be free from his physical body, ultimately, he recognises it as essential for 
his training and pursuit of heaven. 
In Gregory’s anthropology, the spiritual and physical elements form a synergy. Not only does 
the body aid the soul, but the soul aids the body. Gregory claims one purpose of the soul’s 
union with the body is “that it may draw to itself and raise to heaven the lower nature, by 
gradually freeing it from its grossness, […] itself leading on the matter which ministers to it, 
and uniting it, as its fellow-servant, to God” (Or. 2.17). He sees this as the achievement of 
martyrs “whose very bodies possess equal power with their holy souls, whether touched or 
worshipped” (Or. 4.69). The body aids the soul in its pursuit of heaven and the soul raises 
the body with it. Consequently, Gregory considers the body his “fellow heir” (Or. 14.6) and 
explains in heaven the soul “receives its kindred flesh, which once shared in its pursuits of 
things above” which “enters with it upon the inheritance of the glory there” (Or. 7.21). 
Gregory does not believe the soul should strive to be free of the body, but rather carry it 
heavenwards. A similar idea in Gregory is that “the dust, on wings of spirit, might be raised 
up also to the image” (Carm. 2.1.45, 19). This is contrary to Gabrielle Thomas’ idea that for 
Gregory “the eikon relates not only to the soul but also to the whole, dynamic human 
person”.31 She argues this partly because “as Eikon refers to the transcendent Logos and the 
incarnate Christ, likewise eikon denotes the whole human person, body and soul”.32 
However, Gregory uses “Eikon” to refer to the whole Christ, as Christ achieves what we 
strive to: raising the body to the soul in the image, so that both might be considered the 
Eikon. Curiously, Gregory often describes the body as something separate to himself — “my 
enemy”, “my fellow-servant”, “my fellow heir” (Or. 14.6). Thus, Beeley rightly notes for 
Gregory “the soul is practically synonymous with the willing self or the human subject, 
whereas the body is a secondary part of that subject and can even appear to be an 
object”.33 For Gregory the human person is primarily the soul which is akin to God and 
divine. This is distant from Athanasius’ thoroughly earthly humanity. 
 
31 Gabrielle Thomas, The Image of God in the Theology of Gregory of Nazianzus (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2019), 118. 
32 Thomas, Image, 36. 
33 Beeley, Gregory, 80. 
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Exploring the purpose of humanity’s constitution, we also find the purpose and destiny of 
human life itself. The Edenic state for Athanasius was static. Humanity preserved the grace 
and continued to exist in stability. In contrast, for Gregory, humanity from the beginning is a 
creature in a state of growth. Earthly life is training for something else, namely deification. 
This is the purpose for which we were created. As Gregory explains, “the imperishable Son 
had made for himself a man in order to have new glory, and so that, in the last days, leaving 
the earth, man might journey from here to God, as god” (Carm. 1.1.8, 98-99). Gregory 
defines humanity as “a living creature trained here and transferred elsewhere, and, to 
complete the mystery, deified through inclination toward God” (Or. 38.11). The original 
created intention for humanity was that they should live an earthly life, struggling with the 
body, that they might grow and attain heaven as a prize, achieving “that deification for 
which we were born” (Or. 4.123), raising up the body with them “and uniting it, as [their] 
fellow-servant, to God” (Or. 2.17). Humanity’s composition provided that which it required 
to achieve its created destiny of theōsis. As Beeley notes “God’s mercy is shown from the 
beginning, in creating us as mixed creatures whose very constitution provides for our 
training and divinization”.34 The Fall disrupts the potential for humanity to fulfil its created 
destiny and thus, contrary to Athanasius for whom deification is only ever possible through 
the incarnation, as Beeley explains, “salvation is the restoration of the process of theosis 
that God established in creation”.35 The picture of Edenic humanity in our Fathers differs 
substantially. Athanasius’ humanity stands distinct from and entirely dependent upon God, 
while Gregory’s humanity is in part akin to divinity and naturally able to progress towards 
God and theōsis. 
The Fall 
As in Athanasius, the Fall sees the destruction of the Edenic state. Gregory’s focus, unlike 
Athanasius’, is on the Genesis story. He shows particular interest in the Tree of Knowledge 
“which was neither planted from the beginning in an evil way nor forbidden through envy 
[…] but would be good if possessed at the right time. For the tree is contemplation […] 
which is only safe for those of mature disposition to undertake; but it is not good for those 
who are still simpler and those greedy in their desire, just as adult food is not useful for 
 
34 Beeley, Gregory, 82. 
35 Beeley, Gregory, 119. 
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those who are still tender and in need of milk” (Or. 38.12). The Tree was initially forbidden, 
that humanity might grow in virtue by adherence to the commandment. However, when 
their training was complete it would have been good for them, being contemplation. Having 
grasped it prematurely, the Tree was not the good for them that it was intended to be. 
Gregory understands Adam’s sin as universal, lamenting “alas for my weakness, for that of 
the first father is mine!” (Or. 38.12) and claiming, “for my brief moment of pleasure I was 
condemned to sorrow […] through the tasting of the fruit” (Or. 19.14). The devil also plays a 
prominent role in Gregory’s account. He believes Satan deceived humanity since he did not 
“wish God's creature to draw near to the divinity whence he'd fallen, since he longed to 
have humans with him in a common sin and darkness” (Carm. 1.1.7, 63-65). Winslow notes 
“The substance of Satan's trickery was to offer us something that was not his to give, 
something that belonged, in fact, to us, but not yet. ‘Ye shall be as god,’ he said. In the face 
of this offer, Adam and Eve sought to grasp the very thing that was to have been theirs, had 
they been willing to wait, namely, theōsis”.36 Humanity does exactly what it should not, 
overcome by ambition they try to prematurely seize their deification. This is another 
departure from Athanasius, for whom the Fall was caused by a process of humanity turning 
from God. 
The Fall unbalanced the delicate synergy of human nature. A recurring idea in Gregory, 
drawing from Genesis 3:21, is that upon tasting the fruit humanity “was clothed in the 
tunics of skin, that is perhaps the more coarse and mortal and rebellious flesh” (Or. 38.12). 
Humanity’s material element, which once aided them in attaining their heavenly destiny, 
became ‘more coarse’ and heavy. Adam is “weighed down to his earth in coats of skins” 
(Carm. 1.2.1, 93). No longer can humanity aspire to raise up the body to divine heights, since 
the struggle with the body has become too challenging for the soul to turn to God. Winslow 
describes the Fall as a transition from “creative struggle” between humanity’s higher and 
lower elements to “open warfare”.37 It often appears Gregory resents the body, but as 
Harrison notes, “the problem is with fallen flesh, not embodiment as such”.38 Indeed 
Gregory laments, “while God has provided every member as good, to do good things, evil 
has found them an instrument towards my death” (Carm. 2.1.45, 59-60). The body is an 
 
36 Winslow, Dynamics, 64. 
37 Winslow, Dynamics, 68. 
38 Harrison, Festal, 51. 
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essential part of a human, necessary for attaining heaven, to which it is co-heir. However, 
the coarseness of fallen flesh upsets the balance between humanity’s parts so the soul no 
longer struggles with the body, but hopelessly wars with it. Gregory writes of “the internal 
warfare within ourselves […] against the law of sin, which wars against the law of the spirit, 
and strives to destroy the royal image in us, […] so that it is difficult for anyone […] to 
overcome the depressing power of matter” (Or. 2.91). This is not our natural created state, 
but the result of the Fall’s corruption of our natural equilibrium. Matz suggests there is a 
linguistic distinction for Gregory between σῶμα and σάρξ. The former refers to “that part of 
a person that is material, corporeal […] the term is morally neutral”.39 He explains “Adam, 
who had always had a sōma, now after eating from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and 
Evil has a sarx, too. It is this presence of sarx that now contributes to our continued bent 
towards sinful actions”.40 Gregory claims the Fall results in the corruption of humanity’s 
natural condition as something is added (σάρξ) upsetting their natural equilibrium, while for 
Athanasius the Fall involves the loss of something (grace), revealing humanity’s natural 
state. Humanity’s natural state for Athanasius is post-fallen humanity, for Gregory it is pre-
fallen humanity. Additionally, while turning from God to the material is the cause of the Fall 
for Athanasius, for Gregory material obsession is a consequence. Notably, the state of fallen 
humanity for both is characterised in part by an inability to turn from the material to the 
divine. 
Gregory’s views differ from Athanasius’ regarding corruption and death. For Athanasius 
humanity is naturally subject to dissolution, whereas Gregory suggests humanity is naturally 
immortal in part. Considering the physical and spiritual elements in himself, Gregory claims 
to be “mortal and immortal” (Or. 7.23), for while the body is “perishable failing matter, 
which absolutely must be dissolved” (Or. 2.16), the soul “is a breath of God […] divine and 
imperishable. For it would not be right for the great God’s image to disintegrate” (Carm. 
1.1.8, 1-4). Gregory suggests had we not fallen then the whole human “should, by reaching 
the tree of life from the tree of knowledge, have become […] immortal” (Or. 44.4) as the 
body is raised to the image. Yet as Adam fell this was not so. While for Athanasius the 
fleeting nature of fallen humanity’s existence is the ultimate cause for despair, Gregory 
 
39 Matz, “Gregory”, 309. 
40 Matz, “Gregory”, 310. 
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considers death introduced by the Fall a positive. He explains humanity “gained a certain 
advantage from this; death is also the cutting off of sin, that evil might not be immortal” (Or. 
38.12). Death, again, is something added to human nature not proper to it, as Winslow 
explains, “mortality is not part of the ‘natural man,’ that is of our created condition. Gregory 
[…] regards the fall as a fall away from the natural state, not as a fall into the natural 
state”.41 Again our fathers diverge and Winslow actually contrasts Gregory’s view with the 
idea that Edenic immortality was “a ‘supernatural’ grace bestowed tentatively and then 
removed because of our freely chosen selfish disobedience”, which is almost exactly 
Athanasius’ view.42 However, we find agreement in the Fathers’ concept of being, as 
Gregory too understands God to be “he who is” and “the very source of our being” (Or. 
19.8), whereas “evil has no substance” (Or. 40.45). Thus, sin for Gregory, as Athanasius, 
occurs when humanity “delights in material, things unstable and fleeting, as if they were 
good” (Carm. 2.1.45, 77-78). 
Summary 
Our Fathers’ ontologies, while not entirely contradictory, have different focuses. Athanasius 
is concerned primarily with the ontological divide between God and everything else, while 
Gregory concentrates on the distinction between the immortal spiritual realm and the 
temporal earthly one. Consequently, they also diverge regarding anthropology. Athanasius’ 
humanity is in nature unstable and entirely dependent upon grace for existence. The body 
and soul, considered ontologically the same, are wholly other than God. In Eden, humanity 
possessed the grace of being in the image which they were tasked with maintaining by 
looking towards God; this was not the deified state. In contrast, Gregory’s humanity is 
naturally divine and earthly, composed of a spiritual element, akin to God, and a material 
one. Through the interaction of these elements, humanity should, if they had not fallen, 
have been able to grow towards attaining heaven and theōsis as a prize. For Athanasius, 
humanity fell by turning from God to material things and becoming habituated to doing so. 
The result was the loss of the grace which gave humanity its privileged sustained existence 
and the revealing of humanity’s natural state, one of corruption. For Gregory, the Fall 
involved humanity ambitiously grasping at their deification for which they were not yet 
 
41 Winslow, Dynamics, 67. 
42 Winslow, Dynamics, 67-68. 
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ready and failing to keep the commandment. The result was the addition of sarx which 
disrupted their natural state, rendering them unable to attain theōsis. For both Fathers we 
find humanity now in a state of decay, habituated to its sin and unable to turn towards God, 
though for Athanasius this is their natural state, while for Gregory it is a perversion of their 
nature. Yet both our Fathers recognise the same need: a need for a saviour. 
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Chapter 2: The Redemptive Work of Christ 
The salvation of humanity and restoration of the Edenic state centres around the 
incarnational union for both Athanasius and Gregory. Differences between our Fathers here 
stem from their anthropology and concept of the Fall. As their views do not align on the 
Edenic state and what the consequences of the Fall were, unsurprisingly their ideas 
concerning how Christ restores this state and overcomes these consequences are not 
identical. 
Athanasius 
To redeem fallen humanity and save them from their natural condition, God becomes 
human to exalt them. Athanasius’ concept of theopoēsis is centred on the exchange 
principle: God “was made man that we might be made God” (DI 54.3). For him, Christology 
and soteriology are intrinsically linked, since it is in the act of becoming human that Christ 
enables us to become divine. However, the incarnation is not for Athanasius the singular 
event of Christ’s conception, but rather the whole of Christ’s human life. In his doctrine of 
salvation human redemption is not contingent upon the cross alone, but is the result of all 
Christ’s life and actions. Regarding the exchange formula, one must understand, as Vladimir 
Kharmalov notes, “The symmetrical structure of this ‘exchange formula’ by no means 
assumes a relationship between equal participants”.43 Athanasius explains “the Flesh did 
not diminish the glory of the Word; far be the thought: on the contrary, it was glorified by 
Him” (AA 4). He labours this point frequently.44 The incarnation involves God assuming 
humanity to raise it up to divine heights with Him. In this way “Mankind then is perfected in 
Him and restored, as it was made at the beginning, nay with greater grace” (CA 2.67). Christ 
not only restores the Edenic state, but more intimately unites humanity with God and 
elevates their status so they become gods themselves. 
Corruption and Death 
The most prominent fruit of Christ’s redemptive work for Athanasius is the bestowal of 
incorruptibility and immortality upon humanity. Chief among the consequences of the Fall 
was the loss of stable existence. Unsurprisingly then, the remedying of this state of 
 
43 Kharlamov, “Rhetorical”, 120. 
44 See CA 3.38, DD 14. 
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corruption is a key aspect of salvation and theopoiēsis. Athanasius explains no other could 
save humanity from their natural corruption than “Christ, Who is the Very Life” (DI 20.1). 
Being life and being itself, when the Logos was united with human nature “it was placed out 
of reach of corruption” (DI 20.4). Humanity’s ontological poverty is rectified by its union 
with God who is himself being. Athanasius writes “the flesh, corruptible as it was, should no 
longer after its own nature remain mortal, but because of the Word who had put it on, 
should abide incorruptible” (CA 3.57). Edenic grace was a greater participation in the Word. 
Incarnational grace is a renewed participation in “the immortality that is from Him” (CA 
3.57). Humanity is still in nature corruptible, but united to being itself it transcends this 
characteristic, becoming immortal, no longer tending towards non-existence. Incarnational 
grace which grants humanity stability of being differs from Edenic grace as Athanasius 
considers the latter “grace from without” while the former is “united to the body” (CA 2.68). 
He explains,  
“the corruption which had set in was not external to the body, but had become 
attached to it; and it was required that, instead of corruption, life should cleave to it 
[…] if death were external to the body, it would be proper for life also to have been 
engendered externally to it. But if death was wound closely to the body and was 
ruling over it as though united to it, it was required that life also should be wound 
closely to the body, that so the body, by putting on life in its stead, should cast off 
corruption” (DI 44.4-5). 
Being is not attached to the body externally, but through the hypostatic union life and being 
are intimately united to human nature, granting humanity greater and more secure 
participation in God who is. 
Athanasius also understands Christ’s death to save humanity from death. Athanasius often 
understands Christ’s undergoing of negative human experiences to be simultaneous with his 
overcoming of them and speaks of death in the same way. He writes Christ “received that 
death which came from men, in order perfectly to do away with this when it met Him in His 
own body” (DI 22.3). However, Athanasius often suggests corruption was eliminated when 
Christ became human and life was united to human nature; he less frequently suggests 
Christ needed to undergo death to bestow immortality. Weinandy has suggested “Having 
wound the body of death closely to himself in the Incarnation, the Word of life transforms it 
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into his incorruptible divine life through his death and resurrection”.45 However, I feel 
Athanasius’ writings are better understood by drawing a distinction between corruptibility 
and death, which is exactly what Athanasius does in a passage from the Festal Letters: “He 
went down to corruption, that corruption might put on immortality, […] He descended into 
death, that He might bestow on us immortality, and give life to the dead” (FL 10.8). Christ 
overcomes human frailties by encountering them in his human life. So human corruptibility 
is overcome by Christ simply becoming human, since he immediately encounters that state 
of tending towards nothingness which humans constantly experience, while death is 
overcome when he encounters it in his own death. The two are connected in Athanasius 
since the result is the same: the bestowal of immortality upon human nature. This requires 
both corruption and death be overcome. 
Suffering 
For Athanasius, theopoiēsis attained by Christ for humanity also involves freedom from 
suffering. Here we see more fully Athanasius’ notion of Christ undergoing human 
experiences to overcome them. Athanasius distinguishes between that which is “proper to 
the very Word by nature” and that which is “proper by nature to the very flesh” (CA 3.34). 
Using 1 Peter 4:1, he explains Biblical accounts of Christ suffering refer to “‘Christ then 
having suffered,’ not in His Godhead, but ‘for us in the flesh,’” (CA 3.34). Remaining 
impassible in his divinity, Christ suffers in his humanity. Athanasius expresses this 
paradoxically, noting “it is strange that He it was Who suffered and yet suffered not” (AE 6). 
Yet, Anatolios notes, “the human attributes of Christ are not simply juxtaposed to the 
divine; they are transformed”.46 Athanasius explains, “He Himself, being impassable in 
nature, remains as He is, not harmed by these affections, but rather obliterating and 
destroying them, men, their passions as if changed and abolished in the Impassable, 
henceforth become themselves also impassable and free from them for ever” (CA 3.34). 
When Christ suffers his divine impassibility encounters human suffering and overcomes it. 
As Athanasius writes “He underwent all things that we by His sufferings might put on 
freedom from suffering” (AM 4). This is essentially the exchange formula again: He who is 
free from suffering suffers, that we who suffer may become free from suffering. This is seen 
 
45 Weinandy, Athanasius, 42. 
46 Anatolios, Athanasius, 149. 
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in Athanasius’ explanation of Christ’s fear, for “the terror belonged to the flesh […] For the 
sake of this flesh He combined His own will with human weakness, that destroying this 
affection He might in turn make man undaunted in face of death. […] He by that so-called 
terror renders men undaunted and fearless” (CA 3.57).  
Athanasius’ understanding of grace as participation is the key to deciphering how Christ 
undergoing human frailties annuls them. God is being and humanity is ontologically 
dependent upon participation in God for existence. Edenic grace was a greater participation 
in God, granting humanity stable existence and now incarnational grace is an even greater 
and more intimate participation in God. Quoting 2 Peter 1:4, Athanasius writes “He has 
become Man, that He might deify us in Himself […] and that we may become henceforth a 
holy race, and ‘partakers of the Divine Nature’” (AA 4). Corruption is a result of a lack in 
humanity, a lack of being. As only God is and God does not suffer, suffering too cannot be 
something in itself, but, like evil, is rather a deficiency. Ignorance is an obvious example of 
this, for to be ignorant is to lack knowledge and this is a frailty which Christ undergoes to 
overcome. Athanasius explains “He knew where Lazarus lay, and yet He asked; for the All-
holy Word of God, who endured all things for our sakes, did this, that so carrying our 
ignorance, He might vouchsafe to us the knowledge of His own only and true Father” (CA 
3.38). Christ encounters a lack in human nature which is overcome as it encounters his 
abundance. The lack is no more since divinity bestows upon humanity what was missing. 
Divine omniscience fills the lack of knowledge in humanity so ignorance is no more. 
Although we might consider freedom of suffering the absence of suffering, in truth suffering 
is the deficiency – the absence of impassibility. Through Christ assuming human nature we 
may “partake of the immortality that is from Him” (CA 3.57). Similarly, through undergoing 
the other frailties of humanity, Christ grants us greater and secure participation in the divine 
attributes rectifying our deficiency. As with immortality, our natural condition remains the 
same, one of deficiency and suffering, but through the grace of participation in the divine 
attributes we transcend our natural state and are freed from our natural frailties. The 
intimacy and security of participation in the divine attributes allows humanity to transcend 
its natural state and become gods. This is the essence of theopoēsis. 




Part of Christ’s redemptive work for Athanasius involves receiving gifts on our behalf of 
which we are unworthy. Athanasius clarifies the meaning of Philippians 2:9, “Therefore God 
also highly exalted him and gave him the name that is above every name”.47 Christ could not 
be highly exalted if he was always God, since he was already the highest and in need of 
nothing. Thus, Athanasius explains “the term in question, ‘highly exalted’, does not signify 
that the essence of the Word was exalted, for He was ever and is ‘equal to God,’ but the 
exaltation is of the manhood” (CA 1.41). Just as Christ does not suffer in his divinity, but in 
his humanity, so too he is exalted within his humanity not his Godhead. Due to our 
connection with his humanity, Christ’s humanity receives for our benefit. So Christ “was 
exalted as man, so, as man, is He said to take what, as God, He ever had, that even such a 
grant of grace might reach to us” (CA 1.42). Athanasius stresses Christ is said to receive that 
which “the mere Word had not needed”, because we needed them, yet “of such a gift mere 
man had not become worthy” (CA 4.6). Sinful humanity is unworthy of high exaltation, yet 
the humanity perfected by Christ may receive these gifts. In places Athanasius suggests the 
Father bestows this exaltation upon Christ, writing “the Father regarding Him vouchsafed to 
man to be exalted” (CA 4.7). Yet elsewhere it is the very act of the Word becoming human 
that effects the elevation of humanity. Athanasius teaches “He had not promotion from His 
descent, but rather Himself promoted the things which needed promotion; […] He 
descended to effect their promotion” (CA 1.38) and elsewhere “the Word being in man, 
highly exalted man himself” (CA 4.6). The key to reconciling these statements is the 
Athanasian principle: the Word “gives from the Father, for all things which the Father does 
and gives, He does and supplies through Him” (CA 1.45). The Father gives through the Son 
and thus as Son of God Christ gives and as Son of Man he receives. We see this in the 
destruction of corruption and suffering. Christ’s redemptive work centres on the interaction 
of divinity and humanity within himself. He gives in his divinity and receives in his humanity. 
Exaltation involves several things for Athanasius. In part exaltation involves humanity 
becoming sons, though this will be considered with pneumatology later. Exaltation also 
involves the transformation of humanity into heavenly creatures. Athanasius explains “For 
whereas the powers in heaven, both Angels and Archangels, were ever worshipping the 
 
47 Here and elsewhere taken from the NRSV. 
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Lord, as they are now worshipping Him in the Name of Jesus, this is our grace and high 
exaltation, that even when He became man, the Son of God is worshipped” (CA 1.42). The 
Word becoming human causes the elevation of humanity to divinity, so Christ is worshipped 
not only as God, but also as human and thus humanity as a whole receives great honour. 
Athanasius suggests this is how incarnational grace is “greater” than Edenic, “For, on rising 
from the dead, we shall […] ever reign in Christ in the heavens” (CA 2.67). Christ “ascend[ed] 
as man, and carr[ied] up to heaven the flesh which He bore” (CA 3.48). Humanity has 
entered the gates of heaven through Christ. Christ ascended to “introduce us all into the 
kingdom of heaven after his likeness” (CA 2.70). Athanasius poetically writes “the heavenly 
powers will not be astonished at seeing all of us, who are of one body with Him, introduced 
into their realms” (CA 1.42), for humanity dwells there already through Christ. Additionally, 
“He Himself is said to have been born, who furnishes to others an origin of being; in order 
that He may transfer our origin into Himself, and we may no longer, as mere earth, return to 
earth, but as being knit into the Word from heaven, may be carried to heaven by Him” (CA 
3.33). We no longer from dust return to dust, but knit to the man from heaven return to 
heaven with him. We rise to heaven, “the flesh being no longer earthly, but being 
henceforth made Word, by reason of God's Word who for our sake ‘became flesh’” (CA 
3.33), for “though an animal body, it is become spiritual, and though made from earth it 
entered the heavenly gates” (AE 9). Our exaltation is that we transcend our earthly nature, 
becoming “Word” which is our deification. United to Christ, our origin becomes heavenly, 
thus it is to this rather than earth that we will return. 
Stability 
We have seen how Christ’s redemptive work involves both giving grace divinely and 
receiving it humanly. Key to Athanasius’ theology is the concept that creatures are defined 
by a perpetually state of lack, while God lacks nothing, but constantly gives. God is defined 
by his generosity, while humanity is fundamentally “a natural recipient” (CA 1.45) of this 
generosity. The hypostatic union for Athanasius means Christ is both the giver and receiver 
of grace. This is important for two reasons. Athanasius suggests God could have “but 
spoken, because it was in His power, and so the curse had been undone, […] but man had 
become such as Adam was before the transgression, having received grace from without, 
and not having it united to the body” (CA 2.68). Peter Widdicombe explains “With such an 
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inadequate giving of grace, grace would have remained ‘external’ (ἔξωθεν) to man, as it had 
been for Adam in paradise. But accommodating himself to man's need in the incarnation, 
the Father creates a union of grace with the body of his Son, and thus grace is no longer 
from outside”.48 Antolios clarifies the distinction Athanasius is really drawing is “between 
the supreme instance of ‘internality’ constituted by the unity of the Word with the body and 
absolutely every other model of interaction between God and humanity”.49 Through the 
incarnation, grace is united to humanity in an internal way. The union of grace and humanity 
is now as intimate as that of the natures in Christ. For Athanasius, “the union was of this 
kind, that He might unite what is man by nature to Him who is in the nature of the Godhead, 
and his salvation and deification might be sure” (CA 2.70).  
The second way the hypostatic union perfects the reception of grace concerns the 
inalterability of the Word. Adam’s alterability was the defining problem with maintaining 
Edenic grace, thus, “it became the second Adam to be unalterable” (CA 1.51). Christ “is said 
humanly to have received, that, whereas the flesh received in Him, henceforth from it the 
gift might abide surely for us” (CA 3.40).  Athanasius claims that which “mere man receives, 
he is liable to lose again […] but that the grace may be irrevocable, and may be kept sure by 
men, therefore He Himself appropriates the gift” (CA 3.38). Anatolios explains, “since the 
giving of one party is always contingent on the other party’s capacity to receive, and since 
humanity had already demonstrated its woeful incapacity to receive and keep the gift, the 
unsurpassable gift of the incarnation is that we were given the very reception of the gift”.50 
Christ perfects our reception of grace. Through his divine inalterability, the grace which he 
receives humanly remains secure, since, unlike Adam, he cannot change and fall away from 
it. The incarnation perfects divine-human relations, as God gives and humanity receives 
securely through Christ. Christ not only “renew[s] the first creation”, but also “preserve[s] 
the new which had come to be” (CA 2.65). The salvation and deification of humanity could 
only be secured by the intimacy of the incarnation and the extension of divine inalterability 
to human nature. 
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Among those gifts Christ gives and receives, none surpass the indwelling of the Spirit. 
Athanasius recognises Christ’s baptism as the moment in which he secures the indwelling of 
the Spirit for humanity. He explains “the Spirit's descent on Him in the Jordan was a descent 
upon us, because of His bearing our body” (CA 1.47). He stresses Christ is “Himself He that 
supplies the Holy Spirit” (CA 1.46), yet for our sake he receives it himself. Anatolios suggests 
“It is Christ's reception of grace — or, more specifically, Christ's human reception of the Holy 
Spirit on our behalf — that is seen as the ultimate ‘securing’ of grace”.51 Athanasius claims 
“no otherwise should we have partaken the Spirit and been sanctified, but that the Giver of 
the Spirit, the Word Himself, has spoken of Himself as anointed with the Spirit for us” (CA 
1.50), but also suggests some prior to the incarnation received it. Anatolios argues 
Athanasius just “want[s] to emphasize that our reception of the Spirit is to be ascribed in a 
most eminent way to the Incarnation, because it is there that the Word himself received 
humanly on our behalf, and thus granted us the definitive ‘remaining’ in grace”, not that 
there was no communication of grace before this.52 Indeed, Athanasius stresses those with 
this grace prior to the incarnation “altered” and “the Spirit was taken away” (CA 1.37). 
Receiving the Spirit at his baptism within his humanity which was united to his divine 
inalterability, Christ secures the Spirit’s indwelling for us in a way impossible prior to the 
incarnation. 
Disposition to Sin 
Humanity fell, turned from God towards the material and became habituated to their sin. 
Christ rectifies this in his redemptive work in two ways. First, his merely being united to 
human nature destroys sin that arises in it. Athanasius suggests Christ became human that 
“by His dwelling in the flesh, sin might perfectly be expelled from the flesh, and we might 
have a free mind” (CA 2.56) and elsewhere, “the Word being clothed in flesh […] every bite 
of the serpent began to be utterly staunched from out it; and whatever evil sprung from the 
motions of the flesh, to be cut away” (CA 2.69). Athanasius connects this to Christ 
overcoming the Devil’s assaults on humanity. He argues our salvation would not have come 
to pass “had the Word been a creature; for with a creature, the devil, himself a creature, 
would have ever continued the battle” (CA 2.70). As God, the Word defeats the devil when 
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he attacks humanity. The second way concerns God assuming a physical body. Athanasius 
suggests “men’s mind having finally fallen to things of sense, the Word disguised himself by 
appearing in a body, that He might as Man, transfer men to Himself, and centre their senses 
on Him” (DI 16.1). Humanity had turned from God to the material and were unable to turn 
back to him. God becomes material so we might fix our minds on him with greater ease. 
Steenberg explains “The Word becomes accessible in a new way to the senses, and in that 
becoming, the senses are brought into contemplation of God himself so that they may 
participate in God himself, and so bring the human person into fuller union with the 
divine”.53 Christ opened a new path to contemplation of God, as God is now discoverable in 
the material. Anatolios suggests since “the soul itself has sunk to the level of the sensible, 
[it] could only be raised up if the Word also condescended to make himself knowable on 
that level”.54 Athanasius actually mentions this incarnational purpose alongside the 
exchange formula, writing “He was made man that we might be made God; and He 
manifested Himself by a body that we might receive the idea of the unseen Father” (DI 
54.3). The Word destroys our inward disposition towards sin by uniting himself with human 
nature and aids us in looking towards God by bringing God to us. 
The Cross 
Occasionally it appears Athanasius considers the cross secondary to the rest of Christ’s 
redemptive life, yet this is not so. Theopoiēsis is not synonymous with salvation for 
Athanasius, but is just one aspect of his soteriology. Thomas Torrance identifies within 
Athanasius, alongside theopoiēsis, “conceptions of atoning expiation, priestly propitiation, 
and substitutionary sacrifice and victory over the forces of evil, which together constitute 
what he means by redemption”.55 Most scholars recognise varying soteriological strands 
within Athanasius, though, as Jules Gross observes, Athanasius “does not synthesize these 
various elements with the deifying role of the incarnation”.56 Athanasius stresses the need 
for Christ to pay “the debt in our stead” (CA 2.66); “offer himself for us through death to the 
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Father” (CA 1.41); pay the “ransoms” (CA 2.7), and serve “the sentence of death” on our 
behalf (CA 2.69). The cross is essential to Athanasius’ soteriology, even if he does not draw 
out how Christ’s sacrifice works alongside his deifying work. In De Incarnatione two strands 
of Athanasius’ soteriology are juxtaposed as he writes “two marvels came to pass at once, 
that the death of all was accomplished in the Lord's body, and that death and corruption 
were wholly done away by reason of the Word who was united with it” (DI 20.5). The first 
marvel concerns the sacrificial death on the cross and the second, the deifying union of the 
Word with human nature. Though Athanasius does not make this step, perhaps Christ’s 
deifying and atoning work depend on each other to bring about salvation. The fruits of 
deification could only be enjoyed by humanity if the debt from their transgression was paid 
and they were released from the law of death, but the atoning work alone would not have 
deified and saved humanity from its natural condition. The fullness of salvation, humanity 
deified and free from the debt of sin, requires both Christ’s deifying life and atoning death. 
Summary 
For Athanasius, Christ’s deifying work revolves around his encountering human deficiencies 
through the assumption of human nature and overcoming them. Encountering corruption 
and death, he grants humanity greater participation in his divine being; encountering 
suffering, he brings humanity into greater participation of his divine impassibility; finding 
humanity lowly, he allows them to share in his exaltation; finding them devoid of the Spirit, 
he brings the Spirit to dwell within humanity, and to seal these gifts he perfects humanity’s 
receptivity to the divine by uniting human nature to himself and providing stability in his 
divine inalterability. Humanity is restored to its Edenic condition and raised higher through 
greater and more secure participation in the divine attributes, allowing them to transcend 
their natural condition. This deifying work, alongside Christ’s atoning death, bring about 
salvation. To quote Athanasius, “the achievements of the Saviour, resulting from His 
becoming man, are of such kind and number, that if one should wish to enumerate them, he 
may be compared to men who gaze at the expanse of the sea and wish to count its waves” 
(CA 54.4). 
Gregory 
The defining phrases of Gregory’s incarnational soteriology resemble Athanasius’. Espousing 
the exchange formula, he declares “Let us become like Christ, since Christ also became like 
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us; let us become gods because of him, since he also because of us became human” (Or. 
1.5). Yet our Fathers diverge on the specifics of Christ’s deifying work. Winslow observes on 
“whether or not the incarnation would have taken place had there been no Fall, Gregory is 
silent”, yet he believes “it certainly would not be inconsistent with his views to postulate an 
incarnation as the independently planned means of conducting mankind further on its 
pilgrimage towards theōsis, although such an incarnation would not have involved suffering 
and death”.57 I am tempted to go further than Winslow and categorically assert the best 
way to understand Gregory’s incarnational soteriology is to consider separately the actual 
deification of human nature through the person of Christ, which would have happened 
regardless of the Fall, and the saving work of Christ which addresses the consequences of 
the Fall and restores humanity to a state whereby they can once again progress towards this 
theōsis. This could be explained as putting the stress on the “also” in the dictum which most 
famously encapsulates Gregory’s soteriology: “The unassumed is the unhealed, but what is 
united with God is also being saved” (Ep. 101.5). Christ both unites human nature with 
divinity, deifying it, and heals and saves humanity from sin and its consequences. That this is 
primarily the work of one action, assuming, often leads to conflating them when reading 
Gregory, yet he regularly treats them as separate purposes of the incarnation. 
The Deification of Human Nature 
As in Athanasius, for Gregory, by assuming human nature the Word deifies it. Mixture is a 
crucial concept for Gregory. Christ is “the new mixture” (Or. 38.13), not body and soul, but 
divinity and humanity. Andrew Hofer argues though Gregory’s mixture language is often 
thought of as him “borrowing from Stoicism, the Stoic doctrines of mixture must be situated 
within the much wider debate in antiquity initiated by Aristotle”.58 Within mixture “for 
Aristotle, there is a sort of transformation so that the stronger overpowers the weaker, 
while for the Stoics, that which is little is preserved intact when it comes into contact with 
that which is greater”.59 We have seen this Aristotelean element in his anthropology, as 
humanity strives for the spiritual side to overcome the material, making them both the 
image. Gregory writes, Christ is “Man and God blended. They became a single whole, the 
 
57 Winslow, Dynamics, 114, note 1. 
58 Andrew Hofer, Christ in the Life and Teaching of Gregory of Nazianzus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 120. 
59 Hofer, Christ, 101. 
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stronger side predominating” (Or. 29.19) and “what was assumed, […] has been anointed 
with divinity and become that which anointed it, and, I make bold to say, one with God” (Or. 
45.13). As in Athanasius, “both what deifies and what is deified are the one same God” 
(Carm. 1.1.10, 61). Beeley notes for Gregory “the subject of Christ's human existence is 
God”, and this “preference for single-nature expressions reflects the crucial asymmetry that 
exists between God and humanity in Christ”.60 God assumes human nature and makes it one 
with him that it too may be considered God. 
The deification of Christ’s human nature is foundational for the deification of all humanity. 
Beeley explains “while the divinization of Christ is in principle the divinization of all 
humanity, in actual practice it is the divinization of only Christ's human nature”.61 Gregory 
argues “involvement with God” and “being made God” are possible “as a result of this 
intermingling” of Christ’s natures (Or. 30.3). Gregory uses the concepts of Christ as “a chief 
corner stone” (Or. 21.7) and “a sort of yeast for the whole lump” (Or. 30.21) to explain our 
deification being built on him. Gregory’s personal language when dealing with Christology 
expresses his belief that we are deified through the incarnation. He writes “This is the 
doctrine of God who's been mingled with you” (Carm. 1.1.10, 12) and that Christ “bears the 
whole of me […] so that I may share in what is his through the intermingling” (Or. 30.6). 
Depicting the incarnational union as that between God and the individual is intended to 
stress that this is the means by which we are united with God, though only in principle. 
Winslow notes, theōsis “is neither immediate nor automatic”.62 In the moment of the 
incarnation all of humanity was not instantaneously deified and united to God, but rather 
because of this event they can be. Gregory writes “Even at this moment he is, as man, 
making representation for my salvation, until he makes me divine by the power of his 
incarnate manhood” (Or. 30.14). This passage is crucial for several reasons. First, “until” 
suggests Gregory is yet to be deified. His deification will occur at the eschaton. Secondly, 
Christ is the acting subject here – he deifies us. Elsewhere, Gregory suggests that theōsis is 
something for which we strive ourselves. Finally, it is “by the power of his incarnate 
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manhood” that we are divinised, suggesting the incarnational union is necessary for our 
deification. God assumes human nature to deify humanity. 
The Healing of Human Nature 
A second purpose of the incarnation is to heal human nature so we can once again strive to 
attain theōsis, to “gain the objects of our hope as a prize of virtue, and not merely as the gift 
of God” (Or. 2.17). Theōsis is about us rising to God and God coming down to us. As Gregory 
writes “As long as each [God and humanity] remains at his own level, the one at the top, the 
other in lowliness, the goodness is not mingled and the love for humankind is not shared, 
and a great chasm that cannot be crossed is in the middle” (Or. 41.12). Our Edenic ability to 
strive for our own theōsis refers to our part in crossing this chasm. God deifying us by the 
incarnation refers to his. Logically, though not explicit in Gregory, had we not fallen, we 
would have walked the path to theōsis raising ourselves to God and he would have become 
incarnate, coming down to meet and deify us as we reached up to him. Yet as we fell and 
could no longer walk this path, God through his incarnation also restores human nature that 
we might do so again. Gregory recognising these dual purposes of the incarnation writes, 
“he comes down to the same level as his fellow-slaves; receiving an alien ‘form’ he bears the 
whole of me, along with all that is mine, in himself, so that he may consume within himself 
the meaner element […] and so that I may share in what is his through the intermingling” 
(Or. 30.6). Having considered the latter, we now turn to the former. 
Uniting human nature to his divinity, Christ heals it so that humanity might again struggle to 
attain its heavenly destiny. Gregory stresses Christ must have possessed a full human nature 
consisting of both the material and spiritual aspects. Famously, he declares “The unassumed 
is the unhealed” (Ep. 101.5) and thus God must have assumed both the body and mind, 
since the mind was “The very thing that transgressed” and thus “stood in special need of 
salvation” (Ep. 101.9).  Christ is “wholly God and man, saving me wholly” (Carm. 1.1.10, 23). 
Harrison claims “Gregory of Nazianzus is exceptionally clear and insightful in describing how 
it is that Christ saves us”, referring to the dictum above.63 While perhaps clear, Gregory is 
not precise. What is certain is that uniting it to his Godhead, Christ destroys our sinful 
nature and purifies us. Christ sets in humanity “a purifying fire” which “consumes matter 
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and evil habits” (Or. 40.36) and “a sword to cut out the roots of wickedness” (Or. 21.7). This 
process happens internally as he “consume[s] within himself the meaner element, as fire 
consumes wax or the Sun ground mist” (Or. 30.6). Less metaphorically, Gregory claims “his 
sinlessness was superior to our level and purged our passions” (Ep. 102.3), elsewhere 
explaining “I could not draw nigh [to God], because of my passions” (Carm. 1.1.9, 55).  
Christ frees humanity from passions and that which prevents the soul from rising to God. 
Doing so he restores the image. Gregory explains “he lit a lamp, his own flesh, and swept 
the house, cleansing the world of sin, and searched for the coin, the royal image covered 
with a heap of passions” (Or. 38.14). Gregory resembles Athanasius in understanding the 
union of humanity with divinity to result in the former being purged of its sinful nature and 
material obsession. Opposing Apollinarianism, Gregory stresses Christ assumed a soul, yet 
equally important to him is that Christ assumed a body along with “flesh”. Gregory believes 
“God's love for us could not have been revealed in any way other than by mention of ‘flesh,’ 
meaning he came down […] to a meaner level” (Ep. 101.12). In the incarnation, “The 
fleshless one takes flesh, the Word is made coarse” (Or. 38.2). It is flesh which prevents the 
soul from raising the body to divinity. This “coarse” element is united to the Word that he 
might overcome it. When resurrected he is “no longer flesh yet not without body but […] 
with a more deiform body […] without fleshy coarseness” (Or. 40.45). Humanity is 
remoulded as Christ frees it from the passions and coarseness of the flesh which prevent the 
soul rising to heaven with the body, allowing us to once again walk the path of theōsis. 
The Path to Theōsis 
Christ not only restores us to a state whereby we might walk the path to theōsis, but also 
adapts the path to our fallen condition. Gregory suggests Christ “goes to sleep, in order that 
He may bless sleep also; perhaps He is tired that He may hallow weariness also; perhaps He 
weeps that He may make tears blessed” (Or. 37.2). Winslow suggests here Gregory is 
expressing an exchange of properties similar to Athanasius, whereby Christ assumes human 
weaknesses to overcome them through his divine attributes.64 Gregory does claim “each 
property of His, Who was above us, was interchanged with each of ours” (Or. 2.24), which 
seems to support this reading. Yet for Gregory the exchange of properties is less literal and 
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more poetic than Athanasius. Whenever he discusses exchange, he does not mention 
suffering or specific human properties, but is less precise, explaining “He assumed what is 
worse that he might give what is better, He became poor that we through his poverty might 
become rich” (Or. 1.5). Winslow is mistaken. Christ’s blessing of these aspects of human life 
is not an overcoming of them as in Athanasius.  Gregory’s view is rather, as Harrison notes, 
that “God becomes present in the most ordinary of human activities”.65 Here again, what is 
vital is that, as Beeley observes, “the subject of Christ’s human existence is God”.66 God lives 
a human life of human activities that we might unite our own lives to him. Regular human 
experiences are now a path to God. God has slept, so now this act is divine. He has wept so 
this becomes a path to him. Since God himself has done them, the natural processes of 
human existence become a way to divinity. As Hofer explains “Christ’s very presence 
sanctifies […] all of human life, even its less edifying actions”.67 
On this account, Gregory, like Athanasius, considers our post-incarnational condition 
superior to our pre-lapsarian state. Through Christ’s life, God “shares with us a second 
communion, much more paradoxical than the first; then he gave us a share in what is 
superior, now he shares in what is inferior” (Or. 28.13). In the beginning we were given the 
soul and the image, a share in what is above, that we might struggle to raise up our whole 
self to God. Now God shares our human condition, so all human life becomes a path to him. 
Gregory, like Athanasius, suggests God could have brought salvation “by the mere 
expression of his will”, yet “What he did give us was greater and more compelling: he 
embraced human feelings and the human condition” (Or. 19.13). Suffering holds a special 
place for Gregory among that which Christ assumes. This is the greatest marvel, that God 
incorporates the lowest point of human existence into the plan of salvation, as “God 
becomes man and suffers with our suffering” (Or. 44.4). In part Christ blesses suffering 
itself, though Gregory also links suffering with Christ honouring obedience. Christ “honours 
obedience in practice and puts it to proof by suffering. Just as in our case, the disposition is 
an unsatisfactory thing unless we give it practical effect — deeds show disposition” (Or. 
30.6). Obedience to the commandment allowed us to develop in Eden, so too Christ 
honours obedience that again this might be a means by which we grow in theōsis. God 
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shares our condition, even the lowest point of it, that he might transform human 
experiences, even suffering, into a means of rising to him. Athanasius Murphy explains 
“Because the Word united himself to our human nature, he opened up a path to the divine 
life that was not available before”.68 
As well as creating new paths for theōsis, Christ also reveals how attain it. Gregory explains 
Christ’s “conduct has been handed down to the extent of being a model for ours while 
avoiding a complete likeness” (Or. 40.30). We should not completely mimic Christ, but by 
living a human life, Christ demonstrates how we should live to attain heaven. In this way his 
works “are training from God for us” (Or. 2.25). Harrison observes, in Oratio. 14, Christ is 
“the all-encompassing exemplar, in a long list that maps many different mimetic paths to 
salvation”.69 Most crucially, Christ’s “own suffering […] teaches us suffering, of which also 
our reward is the kingdom of heaven, and to become a god above human suffering” (Or. 
25.2). In particular, “by his passions [he] teaches suffering” (Or. 45.21). Christ teaches us 
how to conduct our lives to walk the path to theōsis, done so most admirably by suffering in 
obedience to him. Alongside suffering, Christ “shows that the best way to be exalted is 
lowliness” (Or. 38.14) and “was exalted, in order that you […] might learn to be nobler, to 
ascend with the Godhead and not linger on in things visible but rise up to spiritual realities” 
(Or. 38.14). Those things which Christ sanctifies by doing himself he also teaches us to 
imitate. Murphy suggests that living humanly as an example, Christ “allows there to be a 
complete road map laid out for the believer to follow, with the arrows pointing in the 
direction of the divine and Christ himself as the road to travel upon”.70 Christ not only opens 
new paths to theōsis, but through his life and conduct he shows us the way to walk them. 
Among that which Christ sanctifies as paths for theōsis and teaches us to imitate, none are 
more important to Gregory than baptism. Here again, Gregory understands Christ’s life as 
mapping out how we should live. He writes “Jesus is baptized […] The pure one, and by 
John, and at the beginning of his signs. What are we to learn and what are we to be taught 
by this? To purify ourselves beforehand, and to be humble minded, and to preach when 
mature both in spiritual and bodily stature” (Or. 39.14). Christ’s conduct here is a “lesson” 
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(Or. 39.14). Through his baptism, Christ teaches us to be baptized. Gregory calls his 
congregation to imitate Christ’s baptism as much as possible, particularly to “purify 
ourselves beforehand” to “assure the security” of baptismal grace “through a disposition 
towards the good”, as Jesus, “the pure one” did (Or. 39.14). Gregory considers baptism 
crucial for theōsis and here, as Matz observes, baptism becomes “one of the stops along 
that road which Jesus himself specially sanctified for the furtherance of one's journey”.71 
Gregory focuses particularly on Christ being baptized to “sanctify the Jordan” (Or. 39.15) or 
elsewhere “for the purification of the waters” (Or. 38.16). Matz explains “Recalling the third 
chapter of John's Gospel […], Gregory pointed out that Jesus consecrated people for the 
water component of their salvation by sanctifying the waters of baptism”.72 Undergoing 
baptism, Christ sanctifies the act (and water) and points to its necessity in the journey of 
theōsis. 
The Cross 
Gregory links the cross with deification more than Athanasius. He writes “through Christ's 
sufferings, you may become God hereafter” (Carm. 1.1.2, 48). However, like Athanasius, he 
is not precise on how. Certainly, this is the lowest part of the human condition and 
undergoing the cross, Christ introduces God even into the lowliness of suffering and death. 
Perhaps this is why “We needed a God made flesh and made dead” (Or. 45.28). The cross is 
also perhaps the ultimate perfecting of obedience as a path to theōsis. Yet most of 
Gregory’s theology of the cross focuses upon sacrifice and ransom. Regarding sacrifice, 
Gregory explains “He was the sacrifice, […] He dedicated his blood to God, and cleansed the 
entire world” (Carm. 1.1.2, 75-76) and “by the blood of the Lamb he cleanses from every 
defilement, lifting away guilt from mortals by a heavenly method” (Carm. 1.2.1, 170-171). 
Humanity is purified by his sacrifice. Regarding ransom, Gregory writes “God suffered in the 
form of a man, giving himself as a ransom to deliver us” (Carm. 2.1.11, 1602-1604).  He 
identifies himself with Christ here, claiming “For this, too, is mine, this blood which Christ 
my God poured out in restitution for ancient longings, and as a ransom for the world” 
(Carm. 1.1.9, 80-81). Though it is unclear how sacrifice and ransom lead to our deification in 
Gregory, it would not be unreasonable to hypothesize, as we did with Athanasius, that the 
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sacrifice needed to be offered and the ransom paid, that we might fully enjoy the deifying 
gifts wrought by Christ. 
With Athanasius, Gregory maintains Christ overcomes death by his death. He writes Christ 
“by death destroys death” (Or. 29.20); “death was put to death by flesh” (Or. 39.13), and 
Christ “by dying, slaughter[ed] the slaughterer” (Carm. 1.1.10, 9). Harrison suggests “it is the 
presence of God, the source of life, within death that is lifegiving”, which seems to give us a 
strong Athanasian parallel.73 However, Gregory does not explicitly claim this. There is 
ambiguity regarding how Christ destroys death by death, though Gregory is certain that we 
may share in eternal life because of the cross. What is clearer is how Christ defeats Satan on 
the cross. Thomas observes “Gregory does not treat the devil as a linguistic construction, 
but rather as a ‘real’ enemy” and thus it was essential he be overcome to prevent him 
leading humanity to sin.74 Gregory suggests Christ tricks Satan. As Satan “out of 
shamelessness leapt upon the visible Adam” he “encountered God and was defeated” (Or. 
39.2). Satan, now defeated, may no longer deceive humanity into turning from their path of 
theōsis as he did in Eden. Elsewhere Gregory describes how Christ “offered himself to God 
so as to snatch us from him who had us in his power, so that, in exchange for him who fell, 
he might take the Christ: but he who christens cannot be caught” (Carm. 1.1.10, 69-72). This 
is a slightly different narrative, but the key theme remains: Christ deceives Satan, as Satan 
deceived us, that he might be overcome and we, no longer under his power, may walk again 
the path to theōsis. 
Summary 
Aspects of Gregory’s incarnational soteriology resemble Athanasius’. The notion that God 
deifies his human nature through his assumption of it, which forms the basis for our own 
deification is very similar to Athanasius. His concept of mixture to explain this process is not 
present in Athanasius. The restoration of humanity to a state whereby it may grow in its 
theōsis is an unsurprisingly significant point of divergence from Athanasius who did not have 
the same concept of Edenic growth towards deification. However, our Fathers agree on how 
Christ restores the Edenic state in places, particularly regarding the overcoming of sinful 
human nature through union with divinity and the defeat of Satan. Gregory understands 
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Christ’s undergoing of human acts to constitute his sanctifying and transforming them into 
steps on the path to theōsis, while Athanasius focuses on Christ’s negative human 
experiences and how he overcomes them by undergoing them. Both Fathers discuss the 
exchange of properties in Christ, though this is more crucial for Athanasius; Gregory 
discusses it more poetically. Themes of ransom and sacrifice are found in both, though both 
fail to integrate these themes explicitly with Christ’s deifying work. Having considered 
Christ’s role in our divinization, we now turn to the Spirit. 
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Chapter 3: Pneumatology and Baptism 
Baptism is the means, for both Fathers, by which the fruits of Christ’s redemptive work are 
received by the individual. As one might expect, given the fruits of Christ’s work are not 
identical in their theologies, so too that which is received through baptism differs. However, 
it is striking that the mode of reception of these fruits is the same for Athanasius and 
Gregory, namely baptism, through which the Spirit comes to dwell within the believer. 
Athanasius 
The Deifying Spirit 
The work of the Son and the Spirit are intimately connected in Athanasius. Through his 
redemptive work, Christ deifies his own humanity, but this deification must be appropriated 
to the individual through the reception of the Spirit. This is why Athanasius understands 
Christ’s securing of the Spirit to be “the ultimate ‘securing’ of grace”.75 Athanasius considers 
Christ “‘First-born’ of us”, because “His flesh before all others was saved and liberated, as 
being the Word's body; and henceforth we, becoming incorporated with It, are saved after 
Its pattern” (CA 2.61). As C.R. Strange explains “the rest of mankind can be divinized by 
virtue of the relationship which each man enjoys with the divinized humanity of the Son”.76 
Athanasius writes “He is a Vine and we knit to Him as branches, — not according to the 
Essence of the Godhead; for this surely is impossible; but according to His manhood, for the 
branches must be like the vine, since we are like Him according to the flesh” (CA 2.74). 
Christ’s divinity communicates grace, that is participation in divinity, to his humanity. 
Subsequently, we are “knit” to Christ’s humanity, since it is in this aspect that he is like us, 
and through this union we enjoy participation in his divine attributes and communion with 
his divinity. The Spirit unites us to Christ’s deified humanity and in this way “what the Word 
has by nature” is “given to us through the Spirit irrevocably” (CA 3.25). The Spirit is “that 
which joins creation to the Word” (AS 1.25) and thus “it is through the Spirit that we are all 
said to be partakers of God” (AS 1.24). The indwelling of the Spirit grants this unity with the 
Son, since “When we partake of the Spirit we have the Son; and when we have the Son, we 
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have the Spirit” (AS 4.4). Thus, we see how intimately connected the work of the Spirit and 
Son are in communicating theopoiēsis to us. 
Union with God 
The crux of deification, union with God, is the result of the indwelling of the Spirit. Anatolios 
suggests “Salvation is primarily and ultimately, for Athanasius, a matter of being “joined” to 
God”.77 Athanasius conceives of two ways in which we come to be united to God. The first 
concerns the hypostatic union. He writes “if the Son were a creature, man had remained 
mortal as before, not being joined to God” (CA 2.69). United to the humanity of Christ 
through the Spirit we are united to the Godhead through the union of Christ’s natures, thus 
in one sense Athanasius suggests union with God is the combined work of the Spirit and the 
Son as above. However, Athanasius also attributes our union with God specifically to the 
indwelling of the Spirit, since it too is God. He explains we “apart from the Spirit, are strange 
and distant from God”, but “by the participation of the Spirit we are knit into the Godhead” 
(CA 3.24). Athanasius’ language stresses the intimacy of our union with God. Considering 1 
John 4:13, he writes “because of the grace of the Spirit which has been given to us, in Him 
we come to be, and His in us; and since it is the Spirit of God, therefore through His 
becoming in us, reasonably are we, as having the Spirit, considered to be in God, and thus is 
God in us” (CA 3.24). This Johannine parallel is crucial for Athanasius in expressing unity. He 
regularly cites John 14:11, “I am in the Father and the Father is in me”, to express the unity 
of the Father and Son, often treating John 10:30, “The Father and I are one”, as a 
synonymous expression.78 Likewise, on the unity of Christ, he writes “He was Very God in 
the flesh, and He was true flesh in the Word” (CA 3.41). Perhaps for Athanasius us in God 
and God in us expresses our coming to be involved in the unity of the Trinity and the unity of 
Christ. At very least he understands it to stress the intimacy with which we are united to 
God. 
Sonship 
Theopoiēsis also involves being adopted as sons. Kharmalov claims “More clearly than any 
Christian writer before him, Athanasius makes a direct identification between deification 
and divine sonship”, while Gross suggests “He employs as synonyms the terms θεοποιειν 
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and υἱοποιειν”.79 Athanasius suggests it is our divine sonship, along with our becoming 
heavenly creatures, which defines our exalted status, explaining Christ “promoted the things 
which needed promotion; and if He descended to effect their promotion, therefore He did 
not receive in reward the name of the Son of God, but rather He Himself has made us sons 
of the Father” (CA 1.38). Widdicombe notes “Sonship by adoption signals our participation 
in the divine love of the Father for the Son and the Son for the Father”.80 Athanasius claims 
“receiving the Spirit of the Son, [we] might have confidence to call Him by grace Father, who 
is by nature our Lord” (CA 2.51). Athanasius is clear that it is because of the Spirit within us 
that we are named sons, citing Galatians 4:6, “as the Lord is Son, the Spirit is called Spirit of 
sonship” (AS 1.25). Weinandy explains “The Spirit is the Spirit of Sonship […] because he 
partakes of the Son's full divine life with all its divine attributes, and he does so precisely 
and uniquely as the Spirit”.81 The relationship between the Son and Spirit allows Athanasius 
to suggest our sonship derives from the indwelling of the Spirit, since “When we partake of 
the Spirit we have the Son” (AS 4.4). Thus, “the Father calls them sons in whomever He sees 
His own Son” (CA 2.59). Through the Spirit dwelling in us the Son comes to dwell in us 
allowing us to participate in his divine Sonship, becoming sons ourselves, reordering the 
relationship between us and God as we participate in the relationship between the Father 
and Son, so “God, being first Creator, next, as has been said, becomes Father of men” (CA 
2.61). 
Baptism 
Baptism is the moment in which we receive these gifts. Baptism is important to Athanasius, 
for, as Jeffery Finch recognises, this “is the sacrament through which the indwelling of the 
Holy Spirit is initially given”.82 Thus, it is in baptism that we receive the deifying gifts 
wrought by Christ, union with God and exalted status as adopted sons. Consequently, it is 
crucial for Athanasius that the right terms are used. Athanasius attacks the Arians, arguing 
Christ bids “us be baptized, not into the name of Unoriginate and originate, nor into the 
name of Creator and creature, but into the Name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost” (CA 1.34). 
This is as “For with such an initiation we too, being numbered among works, are made sons” 
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(CA 1.34). By baptizing themselves into “the name of one who exists not, they will receive 
nothing”, by which he means “to the Father they will not be joined, not having His own Son 
by nature, who is from Him, who is in the Father, and in whom the Father is, as He Himself 
has said; but […] remain destitute and stripped of the Godhead” (CA 2.43). Athanasius 
argues so passionately since baptism is the vehicle by which we receive our theopoiēsis and 
salvation is impossible without it. He stresses the need to be baptized into the full Trinity, 
since through baptism we come to participate in their unity. He claims those “baptized in 
the name of the Father alone, or in the name of the Son alone, or in the Father and the Son 
without the Holy Spirit, receives nothing” (AS 1.30), since God is Trinity and to divide the 
Trinity is to lose God. Using the name Father we recognise our new status as sons.83 Baptism 
is the most fundamental element of Christian life for Athanasius, for in this sacrament we 
receive the Spirit, which unites us to the deified humanity of Christ and the whole Godhead, 
and elevates us to the status of sons whereby we participate in the love which is between 
the Father and the Son. 
Summary 
For Athanasius, through his reception of the Spirit, Christ has secured its indwelling for 
humanity. This indwelling communicates the graces of the incarnation to us by uniting us to 
the deified humanity of Christ. The Spirit also unites us to God as we come to dwell in him 
and him in us, and names us sons as we come to participate in that unitive love between the 
Father and Son, as God, our creator, becomes now too our Father and we transcend that 
ontological divide between God and creatures. These gifts are received through baptism, 
the sacrament through which we receive the Spirit. 
Gregory 
Deification through Baptism 
With baptism, as the incarnation, there initially appears to be similarity between Gregory 
and Athanasius, but again beneath the surface these similarities become less apparent. 
Gregory describes baptism as the “bloodless sacrifice by means whereof we are made 
partakers with Christ, both in His sufferings and in His divinity” (Or. 4.52). This, as in 
Athanasius, is done through the Spirit who “deif[ies] me through baptism” (Or. 31.28). 
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Additionally, Gregory warns against dividing the Godhead in baptism, or one will “have 
neither the grace or the hope of grace, and in a short time shipwreck your salvation” (Or. 
40.44). At first glance, baptism appears to be the sacrament through which we are made 
partakers of Christ’s divinity through the Spirit and thus deified for both Fathers. However, 
Gregory does not really understand us to be divinized at the point of baptism. Through 
baptism we become, in Russell’s words, “gods in principle”, yet as Winslow notes “baptism 
is not an irrevocable or ineradicable promise of salvation or of theōsis”.84 Beeley identifies 
baptism as “the definitive beginning of the Christian life”, explaining “it does not function as 
a purely mechanical act or an irrevocable guarantee of divinization and future salvation, for 
it produces and requires both real transformation and ongoing moral growth”.85 Matz 
concurs, claiming baptism “set Gregory on the path of divinization”.86 Though Gregory’s 
language occasionally resembles Athanasius’ and suggests at baptism we receive our 
deification, in reality baptism starts (or restarts) our journey towards this goal, so while we 
may be considered deified in principle this state is not guaranteed and only realized at the 
eschaton.  
Rebirth 
Gregory, like Athanasius, believes the Spirit communicates the redemption wrought by 
Christ’s incarnate life through baptism. Winslow explains, for Gregory, “What Christ has 
accomplished universally, the Spirit perfects particularly”.87 This is broadly true although 
Beeley offers the corrective that the distinction between Christology and pneumatology is 
not really “between universal and particular salvation”, but “potential salvation embodied in 
Christ and the actual salvation that the Holy Spirit realizes in the Christian life”.88 This is very 
Athanasian. Gregory implores his congregation to “in the Spirit of God receive the radiance 
of the Son” for “If you receive within you the whole Word, you will gather to your own soul 
all of Christ's cures, by which he has cured each individually” (Or. 40.34). The Spirit brings 
the Word to dwell in us, enabling us to receive his saving work. Langworthy notes, “The 
Spirit makes salvation possible, but it is the Son who saves”.89 The Spirit communicates the 
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work of Christ which has remoulded our nature, allowing us to once again walk the path to 
theōsis. Gregory writes “carrying God inside him, a man may have some success here and 
press on all the harder to perfections, towards affinity with God which comes from virtues” 
(Or. 30.19). He suggests baptism is “a correction of character” and means to “purify the 
source” of our actions (Or. 40.32), as it “releases [us] from passions, cutting away all the veil 
that has surrounded us since birth and leading us back toward the life on high” (Or. 40.2). 
Furthermore, when Satan attacks after baptism, Gregory claims you can “Defend yourself 
with the water, defend yourself with the Spirit, in which all the fiery darts of the Evil One are 
extinguished” (Or. 40.10). Christ attained these gifts for humanity through the incarnation, 
remoulding human nature that it might once more strive to do good, not overpowered by 
the material. In baptism the individual receives these gifts as the Spirit brings Christ to dwell 
within them. 
Gregory considers baptism rebirth. He gives baptism the title “bath of rebirth” (Or. 40.4) and 
explains just as God “created what did not exist, so he remolded what did exist, through a 
molding more divine than the first and more exalted” (Or. 40.7). Through baptism “I have 
transformed my first birth” (Or. 40.42). He stresses through his redemptive work, 
communicated to us through baptism, Christ has remoulded humanity’s fallen state, 
bringing it into one which can again strive for theōsis, purified and released from passions, 
able to overcome the material and bodily nature. However, the Spirit’s work is not restricted 
to a singular moment of purification in baptism, but continually works within us. Langworthy 
suggests “The Spirit operates in a manner that continuously reshapes the believer in an 
ongoing, progressive purification”.90 Likewise, Susanna Elm suggests baptism “is both a one-
time historic event as well as an ongoing process intended to restore man to his original 
dignity”.91 The Spirit perpetually works within us, purifying and administering Christ’s 
redemptive gifts. Remoulding is not an immediate process, but the continuous action of the 
Spirit. When Gregory describes the Spirit as him who “forms God here” (1.1.3, 4) and 
baptism as that which makes us “deiform instead of what we now are, recasting without fire 
and re-creating without shattering” (Or. 40.8), he is referring to the continual action of the 
 
90 Langworthy, Gregory, 121. 
91 Susanna Elm, “‘O Paradoxical Fusion’: Gregory of Nazianzus on Baptism and Cosmology (Orations 38-40)”, in 
Heavenly Realms and Earthly Realities in Late Antique Religions, ed. Ra'anan Boustan, and Annette Yoshiko 
Reed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 300. 
Student ID: 14298570 
43 
 
Spirit, initiated at baptism. Through the Spirit’s work within us we are able to rise “up with 
the Spirit” rather than follow “only the flesh” (Or. 40.2). Through baptismal grace we are 
reborn and remoulded, enabled to pursue theōsis through reception of the fruits of Christ’s 
redemptive work and the perfecting of the Spirit. There are areas of similarity with 
Athanasius here, though since the Fathers disagree on the fruits of Christ’s work, the 
benefits communicated to us through the Spirit differ. 
Summary 
For both Gregory and Athanasius, baptism is a vital part of Christian life in which the Spirit is 
received and communicates the fruits of Christ’s redemptive work to the recipient. That 
which is received differs between our Fathers since the fruits of Christ’s redemptive work 
differ. Through baptism Gregory believes we enter a state whereby we may once again 
progress towards theōsis, continuously aided by the Spirit, while for Athanasius baptism 
brings one into a static state of deification sustained by the Spirit’s indwelling. For them 
both, baptism communicates gifts which enable one to defend against the devil and sinful 
nature. It is becoming more apparent that the fundamental distinction between Athanasius 
and Gregory is their respective anthropologies. When their concept of human beings differs, 
their notion of the Edenic state differs, so too the results of the Fall differ, thus the fruits of 
Christ’s redemptive work differ, and now those fruits which humanity receives through 
baptism differ again. 
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Chapter 4: The Christian Life 
Both theopoiēsis and theōsis begin at baptism, but how Christians live after this initial 
reception of grace is crucial to them both. The key element of the Christian life for both 
Fathers is moral living, though their reasons for this differ, with Athanasius seeing this as the 




Athanasius’ doctrine of theopoiēsis has a considerable, often overlooked, moral element. 
Humans, for Athanasius, exist in static conditions rather than states of growth as they do for 
Gregory. Athanasius is binary: one can be with or without grace. Through baptism Christians 
receive the grace of the indwelling of the Spirit, which entails their theopoiēsis. Yet 
Athanasius stresses this condition is, as the Edenic state was, one from which we can fall. 
Citing 1 Samuel 16:14 and Wisdom 1:5, Athanasius explains that should one who has 
received the Spirit turn to wickedness, “the grace given [them] should begin to depart” (FL 
3.3), as “that Holy Spirit and Paraclete which is in God has deserted him” (CA 3.25). Falling 
into sin leads to the loss of the Spirit’s indwelling and consequently the loss of deification. 
Initially this seems inconsistent with Athanasius’ conviction that Christ achieved the security 
of this indwelling through his divine inalterability being extended to us. However, 
Athanasius explains “When then a man falls from the Spirit for any wickedness, if he repent 
upon his fall, the grace remains irrevocably” (CA 3.25). Christ’s inalterable reception of the 
Spirit means grace remains irrevocable for us if we repent upon falling. This is how Christ 
has perfected our reception of grace. Widdicombe explains we “recover our participation in 
the Spirit through repentance, but Athanasius is quite certain that this recovery is only 
possible because of the granting of the Spirit by the Son and the consequent gift of being in 
the Father”.92 He suggests “our inability to remain faithful is anticipated and 
encompassed”.93 Though Christ has given us the grace of maintaining grace, this gift 
depends upon our cooperation with said grace. Our deification is not certain from baptism. 
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Free will is preserved and should we choose to turn to wickedness we may lose the 
indwelling of the Spirit and our deification. Yet, because of Christ’s redemptive work in 
perfecting our reception of grace, should we cooperate with grace and repent upon falling 
then the indwelling of the Spirit remains irrevocable. 
The moral aspect of Athanasius’ theopoiēsis is not merely the avoidance of sin, but also the 
pursuit of virtue and imitation of God. Russell suggests “There are in Athanasius two parallel 
lines along which the concept of deification is developed, the ontological and the ethical”; 
the former concerns deification through baptism and the latter, growing to be more like 
God through virtue.94 Russell is mistaken in separating these strands. For Athanasius, evil is 
the absence of good and similarly he understands sin to be the absence of virtue. He writes 
“for them who walk after His example, the prize is life everlasting, so for those who walk the 
opposite way, and not that of virtue, there is great shame, and peril without pardon in the 
day of judgement” (CG 47.4). The two options are virtue and non-virtue. There is no moral 
neutral for Athanasius, thus one must actively pursue virtue to maintain the Spirit’s 
indwelling or they fall to wickedness. He explains “our will ought to keep pace with the 
grace of God, and not fall short; lest while our will remains idle, the grace given us should 
begin to depart” (FL 5.5). To preserve grace, we must constantly will good and pursue virtue 
for to do otherwise is to fall to wickedness, and cause the grace to depart. Additionally, 
Athanasius understands virtue to be a response to grace. Considering Luke 3:36, Athanasius 
explains “we become merciful, not by being made equal to God, nor becoming in nature and 
truth benefactors (for it is not our gift to benefit but belonged to God), but in order that 
what has accrued to us from God Himself by grace these things we may impart to others” 
(CA 3.19). Thus, he notes, “it is as ‘sons,’ not as the Son; as ‘gods,’ not as He Himself; and not 
as the Father, but ‘merciful as the Father’” (CA 3.20). God has made us like him through the 
work of Christ and the Spirit, so in response we should strive to imitate him as far as we are 
able. Virtuous living is essential for Athanasius, as a means of maintaining the grace of 
deification and as the appropriate response to it. 
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Moral living is essential for preserving the grace of deification. This involves not only 
avoidance of sin, but the active pursuit of virtue, for to do otherwise is to fall to wickedness 
and have the Spirit depart, leaving one bereft of the deifying gifts of the redeemer. Yet, due 




Baptism is crucial to Gregory as the beginning of the Christian life, yet more than 
Athanasius, he understands grace to be communicated in other ways. Harrison suggests 
Gregory understood grace to be communicated through festal anamnesis – the “re-
presentation of God's saving works so that the worshipers can participate in these events as 
present realities and thereby receive the eschatological salvation, new life and sanctification 
divinely accomplished through them”.95 Gregory often claims “Yesterday I was crucified with 
Christ, today I am glorified with him; yesterday I died with him, today I am made alive with 
him; yesterday I was buried with him, today I rise with him” (Or. 1.4). Through the Festal 
celebrations, Gregory blends his life with Christ and participates in his saving works to 
receive their grace. Harrison suggests since “God's saving actions transcend the limitations 
of temporal sequence, the historical events in which God has acted can be present now and 
in the future”.96 Murphy concurs, claiming “When Gregory mentions the Pascha in Or. 45, 
he does not speak of it as a merely historical and completed event. It is something all of his 
listeners can participate in and celebrate at present in the festal liturgy”.97 Consequently, 
Gregory implores his congregation to “Travel blamelessly through all the stages of Christ's 
life and all his powers, as a disciple of Christ” (Or. 38.13), receiving the graces of these 
events as they go. This explains Gregory’s claim that “we have purified the place of this 
assembly by our discourse” (Or. 39.11), since, in Harrison’s words, “Gregory's homiletic re-
tellings and explanations of the festal events enact their anamnesis in liturgical 
celebration”.98 Through recounting the events of Christ’s work in festal celebrations, 
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Gregory encourages his congregation to identify themselves with Christ to participate in his 
saving works which transcend time and are thus truly present, allowing them to appropriate 
the grace of these events. As Gregory expresses it, “How many celebrations there are for me 
corresponding to each of the mysteries of Christ! Yet they all have one completion, my 
perfection and refashioning and restoration to the state of the first Adam” (Or. 38.16). 
Imitation of God 
Grace received through the representation of Christ’s saving works is not limited to festal 
celebrations, but can always be received through imitating Christ and uniting our actions to 
his. Hofer notes “Gregory rejects the idea that Christ’s historical actions are to be exactly 
reproduced by us […] Yet, Christian actions are one, not only with Christ, but with the events 
of his life”.99 Above all Gregory instructs us “By suffering […] imitate his suffering” (Or. 
45.23). Winslow suggests “suffering has no moral value in and of itself”, but “as it is an 
imitatio Christi can it be the means of participating in the victor which Christ effected by his 
suffering and death”.100 Uniting our sufferings to Christ’s cross, we receive the grace and 
purification of this event. Gregory applauds those who “invent for themselves a life of 
sufferings, in imitation of Christ” (Or. 4.73), imitating “God who through his own suffering 
teaches us suffering, of which also our reward is the kingdom of heaven, and to become a 
god above human suffering” (Or. 25.2). Gregory believes Christ’s “conduct has been handed 
down to the extent of being a model for ours while avoiding a complete likeness” (Or. 
40.30). We need not seek out a literal cross to imitate Christ’s suffering, we can do so 
through ascetic practices. Ascetic suffering is important to Gregory, since it is linked to 
obedience, for Christ “honours obedience in practice and puts it to proof by suffering” (Or. 
30.6). For Gregory, humanity “fell through disobedience” (Or. 2.24), by failing to adhere to 
the commandment. By uniting our obedience with Christ’s through suffering we restore our 
Edenic condition. Through imitation and blending our lives with the events of Christ’s life, 
we appropriate the graces of these events. 
Additionally, it is through imitating Christ and God generally that we are to ascend to him. 
Gregory claims we have “been made to imitate God as far as is possible” (Or. 39.7). Through 
imitating God we grow in likeness of him and “preserve” our “noble status” (Or. 6.14), that 
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is the imago Dei. We primarily imitate God through practicing virtue and doing good, for “It 
is in this, in doing good, that man is preeminently divine” (Or. 17.9) and “In nothing does 
man’s affinity with God lie so much as in his capacity to do good” (Or. 14.27). Thus Gregory 
exhorts his congregation to “imitate God’s philanthropy […] You can become God without 
hardship; do not forgo the opportunity for deification” (Or. 17.9). This is unsurprising since 
God is “goodness itself and source of goodness” (Or. 41.9) and creation comes about as “it 
was not sufficient for goodness to be moved only in contemplation of itself, but it was 
necessary that the good be poured forth and spread outward, so that there would be more 
recipients of its benevolent activity” (Or. 38.9). Winslow suggests Gregory’s “statement that 
we resemble God in acts of compassion is related, not to any presuppositions concerning 
the divine attributes and our ability to emulate them, but to the specific act of compassion 
wrought by God in Jesus Christ”.101 However, the passages above suggest otherwise. While 
we are certainly called to imitate Christ since “his conduct” is a “model for ours” (Or. 40.30), 
we were made in the beginning to imitate God’s goodness and imitation of Christ is just 
another way to do this. Gregory claims “If one has nurtured some good quality that has 
molded his character, transgression becomes more difficult than becoming good in the first 
place, for every virtue that is firmly rooted by time and reason becomes second nature” (Or. 
23.1). By nurturing virtue we shall cause goodness rather than evil to naturally flow from us, 
just as God is good and goodness flows from him. 
As God is good and thus we are called to be good, so too Gregory implores us to imitate 
God’s other characteristics. Just as with goodness, Gregory explains “peace […] both belongs 
to God and characterizes God, represents in fact the very essence of God” (Or. 22.1). He 
encourages us to “incline rather to peace as the more Godlike and sublime course” (Or. 
22.15). Similarly we should love, since “God is love” and “This is in fact the name God 
cherishes above all others” (Or. 22.4). God is goodness, love, peace and more and from him 
these things flow. By imitating God’s action, we nurture these virtues within ourselves, 
becoming more Godlike. Gregory encourages us to “Come to be a god to the unfortunate by 
imitating God’s mercy” (Or. 14.26), meaning we may imitate God’s merciful actions towards 
us by being merciful to others and so become like him. Gregory stresses the necessity of 
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actions, since “the disposition is an unsatisfactory thing unless we give it practical effect” 
(Or. 30.6). Erika Brodňanská and Adriána Koželová note “Πρᾶξις was for Gregory the sum of 
all virtues”, since “he states that salvation rests more with deeds without words than with 
words without deeds”.102 Nurturing virtue within ourselves and giving this practical effect 
through virtuous action, we imitate God and grow to be more like him. It is by working “the 
most good possible for ourselves” that we “mak[e] ourselves deiform” (Or. 39.10), since 
“affinity with God […] comes from virtues” (Or. 30.19). Virtue and good actions allow us to 
preserve our divine image and exalted status, and lead to our deification and salvation. 
The Body 
Though Gregory is often pressed into a caricatured Platonic mould, which suggests he held 
great disdain for the body, he actually considers the body a vital part of our development 
towards theōsis. Winslow notes, “the principles by which the first creation were guided still 
hold true for the new”.103 From the beginning God intended that we “make the good even 
our own, not only because it is sown in our nature, but because cultivated by our own 
choice, and by the motions of our will” (Or. 2.17). This we do now, as in the beginning, 
through doing good and imitating God to become like him. As in the beginning, the body 
plays a crucial role in this process. Gregory writes “God has provided every member as good, 
to do good things” (Carm. 2.1.45, 59). Disposition is insufficient without action and thus the 
body is vital, since it is through the body that we act virtuously. So Gregory recognises his 
body as “the helper I need to achieve my novel aims, knowing as I do why I was created and 
that it is through my actions that I am to ascend to God” (Or. 14.6). Goodness and virtue are 
the means for growth in theōsis and it is through the body that one acts virtuously and does 
good. Additionally, the body still has the same functions we observed in chapter one: it adds 
an element of difficulty to the pursuit of goodness that our theōsis might be “a prize of 
virtue, and not merely as the gift of God” (Or. 2.17). Though it is through “the senses, from 
which come falls […] and through them the goad of sin is taken into oneself” (Or. 45.14), 
Gregory implores us to “Devote your body to the service of your soul” (Or. 20.12), that it 
might a tool for deification. Earthly life is not an opportunity to “gratify the pleasures of the 
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belly and to indulge passing delights and ingest what is voided”, but rather an opportunity 
for “ascent or, if I may be so bold, deification” (Or. 11.5). 
Many Paths to Salvation 
Deciphering how Gregory believes one attains theōsis is challenging. Sections of Gregory’s 
writings suggest asceticism is the key, others contemplation or reason and many suggest it is 
by moral living and virtue. This is because, as Gregory repeatedly states, “There are actually 
many ways of salvation, all leading to fellowship with God” (Carm. 2.1.11, 1225-1226). Yet 
generally Gregory considers all these paths to theōsis under the one theme of virtue, hence 
our focus on virtuous living above. Gregory explains the path to deification is “‘One,’ 
because it is the way of goodness: it is the one way even though there are many branches” 
(Or. 27.8). Goodness is the road to salvation which comprises all virtues “which are 
commingled and mixed with each other” (Or. 45.13) so “Each of these [virtues] forms a 
single road to salvation” (Or. 14.5). Gregory claims “Strait is the way of the divine gate, but 
there are many paths that lead into that one” (Carm. 1.2.17, 55-56). He recognises “if […] 
there were also only one road to salvation, […] and if by deviating from it, we stood to lose 
everything and to be cast out from God and eternal hope, nothing would be more 
treacherous than to give the sort of recommendations I have given” (Or. 32.33). 
Consequently, as Harrison notes, “In several places Gregory provides lists of virtues or 
exemplary persons and actions and invites his hearers to choose the ones that fit their own 
character and circumstances”.104 Gregory suggests there are varying levels of heavenly 
reward based upon levels of virtue. He explains “just as there is a wide variety of goals in life 
so in God’s house also there are many rooms, assigned and distributed on the basis of 
individual merit. One man may excel in one particular virtue, a second in another, a third in 
several, a fourth in all” (Or. 14.5). Thus, while pursuing any virtue places one on the road to 
heaven, those who have mastered many will receive greater merit. 
One path to theōsis, of which Gregory often writes and is thus sometimes mistaken for the 
sole path by his commentators, is that of contemplation and philosophy. Gregory speaks of 
his longing for monastic life, of “having no further connection than was absolutely necessary 
with human affairs, and speaking to myself and to God, to live superior to visible things, 
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ever preserving in myself the divine impressions pure and unmixed with the erring tokens of 
this lower world, and both being, and constantly growing more and more to be, a real 
unspotted mirror of God and divine things” (Or. 2.7). He applauds “whoever leads a solitary 
life, not at all mixing with worldly folk, but has divinized the mind” (1.2.17, 1-2) and claims 
“solitary” life “tend[s] to union with God” (Or. 43.62). It is easy to see how one might 
understand Gregory to be pointing to solitary contemplation as the means to theōsis. Yet, 
he explicitly states there are more paths to salvation than just “the one accessible only 
through reasoned discourse and contemplation” (Or. 32.33). Gregory gives this path 
significant attention since it is the one he desires most and is “the pursuit that offers the 
highest reward and the greatest security, for those with understanding” (Or. 19.1). Gregory 
distinguishes between paths “carrying greater risk and prestige” and those “more lowly and 
safe” (Or. 32.33). Contemplation belongs to the former category, but is not the only path. 
Gregory warns against “abandon[ing] the safer paths and converg[ing] on this single one, so 
dangerous and slippery” (Or. 32.33). He asks “is it that the same diet is not appropriate for 
everyone, and allowance has to be made for differences in age and constitution, but the 
same way of life or discourse stands suitable for all? I for my part should certainly not say 
so” (Or. 32.33). Contemplation is a path to theōsis, perhaps even the one with greatest 
reward, yet it is just one path, unsuitable for all to walk. It is one branch of the ultimate path 
to theōsis, that of virtue and goodness. 
Summary 
For both Fathers, the Christian life is defined by moral living, which is not merely the 
avoidance of sin, but the active pursuit of virtue and doing good. Yet, while for Athanasius 
this is a means of preserving our deified status received in baptism, for Gregory virtuous 
living concerns growing towards theōsis as we increasingly come to resemble God. For 
Athanasius, imitation of God is a response to deification, for Gregory it is the means by 
which we attain it. Both Fathers understand doing good to be how we imitate God. Gregory 
also develops the concept of uniting our lives with Christ and making present Christ’s saving 
work through Festal Anamnesis. In doing so we receive the graces of Christ’s saving work 
which purify us and aid us as we strive to become virtuous to earn our deification. We 
particularly do this through imitation of Christ’s suffering, through which we unite our acts 
of obedience to his ultimate act of obedience, overcoming the disobedience of the Fall.  
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Chapter 5: The Deified State 
Athanasius 
Theopoiēsis occurs at baptism, but sees its completion at the eschaton. Though Athanasius 
believes we are deified in this life and tasked with preserving our exalted status, not all the 
fruits of deification are made available to us here. We still suffer and ultimately die. Russell 
posits “although deification begins in principle in this life, its fulfilment is eschatological”.105 
This idea of deification in principle is misleading, since some fruits of deification manifest 
themselves in this life, notably those which aid us against sin. The concept of eschatological 
fulfilment is useful. While we are deified at baptism, the fullness of deification is received at 
the eschaton, when we become immortal and impassible. We are deified by “becoming 
incorporated with” Christ’s humanity and “are saved after its pattern” (CA 2.61). Discussing 
Acts 1:7, Athanasius suggests post-resurrection Christ no longer claims to not know the day, 
as he does in Mark 13:32, as “now the flesh had risen and put off its mortality and been 
deified; and no longer did it become Him to answer after the flesh when He was going into 
the heavens” (CA 3.48). Athanasius understood Christ’s humanity to be fully deified, 
receiving incorruption, knowledge and the rest, once he had resurrected. Since we are 
“saved after its pattern” (CA 2.61), similarly we only receive the fullness of deification upon 
rising again at the eschaton. Contrary to the classic interpretation of Athanasius, this is 
certainly not the destiny of all. Athanasius warns “sinners, and all those who are aliens from 
the Catholic Church, heretics, and schismatics […] are excluded from glorifying with the 
saints” (FL 7.4) and “for those who walk the opposite way, and not that of virtue, there is 
great shame, and peril without pardon in the day of judgement” (CG 47.4). Deified life in 
heaven is not the destiny of all, but only those who pursue virtue. Moral living is essential 
for theopoiēsis. 
We have already discussed all that the deified state consists of for Athanasius. In heaven 
when we experience the fullness of our deification, we shall be united with God and 
participate in all his attributes. We shall be immortal, free from suffering, exalted, made 
sons and ultimately “knit into the Godhead” (CA. 3.24). The relationship between nature 
and grace is the key to understanding Athanasius’ deification. Humanity is naturally 
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creaturely, ontologically impoverished, prone to suffering and everything else revealed by 
the Fall. Through grace we receive our deification, which does not annihilate our created 
nature, but grants us greater participation in the divine attributes, enabling us to transcend 
it. On sonship, Athanasius writes we “have confidence to call Him by grace Father, who is by 
nature our Lord” (CA 2.51). God is naturally our Lord, yet by grace he is now also our Father. 
Anatolios explains the “distinction between nature and grace allows Athanasius to maintain 
that both the original attributions of difference and the reversal of these attributions 
coexist”.106 Our natural state is not changed, yet we transcend it. For Athanasius, “our being 
in the Father is not ours, but is the Spirit’s which is in us” (CA 3.24). Anatolios understands 
this to mean “it is both ours and not ours: ours, by grace and as gift; not ours by nature, not 
something identical with our being”.107 Thus, we are “‘sons,’ not […] the Son; […] ‘gods’, not 
[…] He Himself” (CA 3.20). As Anatolios observes, “deification does not collapse the 
difference between God and creation into a strict equality”.108 God is God by nature, we are 
gods by participation which is grace. 
Summary 
Though we are deified in baptism, the fulfilment of our deification is eschatological. We 
receive many graces of deification now, but upon rising again we shall be deified in fullness, 
being made immortal, free from suffering and receiving all the other gifts from God as we 
are united with him. Heaven is not the destiny of all. Our nature is not changed through 
deification, rather we transcend it through participation in the perfections of God, becoming 
like him. In this way we become gods, but not God. Theopoiēsis is the perfect description of 
this process, since there is no better term to describe one who has been deified than god. 
Participating in all the attributes of God, the deified human becomes as God is himself, with 
the key distinction that we possess these things through participation and grace, while they 
are his by nature. Calling one who has been deified “god” may unsettle the modern reader, 
but ultimately, considering Athanasius’ concept of the deified state, we have to say if it 
walks like a god and quacks like a god, it’s a god. 
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The fulfilment of theōsis, like theopoiēsis, is eschatological. Theōsis is both something we 
strive for and something given to us; “a prize of virtue, and […] the gift of God” (Or. 2.17). 
Gregory recognises “God must descend to us […] and on the other hand that we must 
ascend and thus there will be a communion of God with human beings” (Or. 41.12). We 
strive to ascend to God through virtue, becoming more like him through doing good, while 
God comes down to meet us and “to complete mystery” (Or. 38.11) defies us fully “by the 
power of his incarnate manhood” (Or. 30.14). Harrison suggests theōsis is a process 
beginning at our creation when “Some features of the divine image are already given to us 
[…], such as rationality, freedom and the capacity for growth in virtue and communion with 
God”; then “By free collaboration with divine grace, we are called to grow little by little 
throughout our lifetime into others such as the practice of virtue and spiritual perception” 
and finally we receive “perfection in virtue, immortality, eternal progress into God, and full 
divinization in the age to come”.109 Theōsis is a process of growing in divinity until the 
eschaton when Christ “makes me divine” fully (Or. 30.14). It is in this way both the work of 
God and of us, thus Gregory can both claim “he makes me divine” (Or. 30.14) and implore 
his congregation “let us become gods” (Or 1.5). At one stage Gregory comments “Whether, 
finally, God be the lot of all, let us not here discuss” (2.1.1, 545-546), seemingly falling on 
neither side of the apokatastasis debate. Yet, he is clear elsewhere that he does not believe 
heaven is the destiny of all. He describes the soul as “a being blessed and immortal, and 
destined for undying chastisement or praise, for its vice or virtue” (Or. 2.28) and writes for 
some their end is heaven, while “The others among other torments, but above and before 
them all must endure the being outcast from God” (Or. 16.9). This is logical when we 
consider the necessity of both us reaching up to God and him reaching down. Should one 
treat this life as an opportunity “to gratify the pleasures of the belly and to indulge passing 
delights […] instead of ascent” (Or. 11.5) then they are left outside of God, since it is 
necessary that both God descends to us and we ascend to him “through [our] actions” (Or. 
14.6). 
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Gregory is less clear on the nature of the heavenly deified state than Athanasius. Gregory, 
like Athanasius, certainly focuses on union with God. He writes the Trinity “unites Itself 
wholly to the soul” and it is this “which solely and beyond all else I take it that the kingdom 
of heaven consists” (Or. 16.9). Yet Gregory also stresses that we will become gods ourselves. 
Christ became incarnate “in order that I might be made God to the same extent that he was 
made man” (Or. 29.19). This suggests Gregory believes our eschatological destiny is to 
become gods in a realistic sense, since, as Christ became truly human, so we must be made 
God “to the same extent”. Occasionally, Gregory’s views appear similar to Athanasius, when 
he claims our destiny is to become “immortal” (Or. 38.13) and “a god above human 
suffering” (Or. 25.2). He also stresses we “share in what is [God’s] through the 
intermingling” (Or. 30.6). Such quotations possibly suggest Gregory espoused an Athanasian 
model of coming to share in the divine characteristics. However, one is cautious of making 
such a claim since, as Boris Maslov notes, unlike Athanasius, “Gregory never cites 2 Peter 
1:4 and only rarely uses the vocabulary of participation”.110 Furthermore, Gregory does not 
focus on immortality and impassibility as Athanasius does, and gives little attention to divine 
filiation. Gregory’s deified state clearly differs from Athanasius’. 
The aspects of the deified state which Gregory develops differ from Athanasius, because 
they focus on different aspects of God. Gregory develops a picture of God who is “the Chief 
Good” (Or. 7.4) and “the great Mind” (Carm. 1.2.12, 8). The first of these concepts we have 
considered with relation to theōsis. Pursuing goodness and virtue leads to ascent and 
becoming more like God and, as Harrison notes, “we hope for perfection in virtue […] in the 
age to come”.111 In part we will be considered gods since we will be perfectly good as God is 
good. Gregory’s concept of God as “the great Mind” (Carm. 1.2.13, 8) relates to the other 
key aspect of the deified state. Gregory believes “The kingdom of heaven […] to be nothing 
other than the attainment of that which is most pure and perfect; and the most perfect of 
the things that are is the knowledge of God” (Or. 20.12). Gregory frequently claims 
knowledge of God is perfected in heaven.112 He directly links this concept to theōsis, 
explaining “God is united with gods, and he is thus known, perhaps as much as he already 
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knows those who are known to him” (Or. 38.7). Winslow suggests “we were created, and 
then recreated, to know and be with our Creator. Such knowledge of, and proximity to, God 
are the principle hallmarks of the goal and end of this life, and thus of the beginning of the 
next”.113 Heaven is defined by our contemplation and knowledge of God. This is why “the 
contemplatives and lovers of God […] before the time exercise their heavenly citizenship” 
(Or. 21.25). Importantly, this is God’s activity. Gregory explains God “both contemplates and 
comprehends itself and is poured out by a little to those outside itself” (Or. 40.5) and in the 
beginning “goodness [was] moved only in contemplation of itself” (Or. 39.9). When 
deification is fulfilled and we “discover what God is in his nature and essence” (Or. 28.17), 
we shall be as God is, sharing in his activity as we fully comprehend and contemplate him. It 
is in this sense, coupled with our perfection in virtue, that Gregory considers us to be 
eschatologically made god. 
Summary 
While elements of deification are realised in this life, for both Fathers, we shall only see its 
fulfilment at the eschaton. Neither Athanasius nor Gregory believe this is the destiny of all. 
While all have the potential for deification, if one lives immorally they will be left outside of 
God, departing to Hell. The heavenly deified state consists for both Fathers in union with 
God and being considered gods ourselves. Yet, they differ on why we will be considered 
gods. Athanasius stresses our participation in all the attributes of God, so that we might be 
considered gods by grace, focusing on divine immortality, impassibility and sonship. While 
these aspects are not entirely omitted from Gregory’s work, he develops more the idea that 
we will be like God with regards to being made perfect in virtue and having perfect 
knowledge of God, so our heavenly existence consists fundamentally of contemplating and 
comprehending God’s nature, which is a defining activity of God himself. Athanasius’ 
concept of the deified state perhaps more obviously warrants our being considered gods, 
but Gregory still clearly considers us to be gods in a realistic sense as we share in divine 
activity. Ultimately, the differing views of these Fathers on the deified state stem from the 
aspects of God on which they focus, with God most fundamentally being that which is for 
Athanasius and the chief good and great mind for Gregory. 
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Before concluding we will briefly review the key aspects of our Fathers’ systems. Their 
anthropologies differ. Athanasius characterises humanity as entirely distinct from God and 
entirely reliant upon grace for existence. Their Edenic purpose was to maintain this grace. 
Gregory believes the soul is akin to God and thus humanity naturally shares some similarity 
to God. They were created to grow in likeness to God and ascend from the beginning. The 
Fall for Athanasius is a fall away from grace and return to humanity’s natural state, bereft of 
God’s aid. This state is defined by instability, corruption and disposition to sin. Gregory’s 
fallen humanity shares similar characteristics, yet for him this is a fall from the natural state 
of humanity, not into it. Both Fathers recognise the need for the incarnation to restore and 
deify humanity. In Athanasius’ theopoiēsis, Christ deifies human nature throughout his 
earthly life by granting humanity greater participation in divine attributes and securing 
grace through his divine inalterability. The deifying purpose of the incarnation is twofold for 
Gregory: through the power of the hypostatic union, Christ will unite us to God and make us 
divine at the eschaton, and he has healed human nature, restored it and revealed the path 
to theōsis through his human life. Our individual reception of deification begins at the 
moment of baptism for both Fathers. For Athanasius, we receive the Spirit in baptism which 
unites us to God and the deified humanity of Christ allowing us to appropriate the graces 
wrought for us by his incarnate life. For Gregory, the Spirit purifies the believer in baptism, 
forgiving the sins of the past and aiding them in their struggle to resist future sin and grow 
in virtue.  
Baptism is just the beginning of Christian life for both fathers. As in the beginning, 
Athanasius believes humanity is tasked with maintaining baptismal grace through avoiding 
sin, which would lose the indwelling of the Spirit, and practicing virtue, as the natural 
response to being made god is to act as he does. Gregory understands Christian life in a less 
static sense than Athanasius. He believes humanity is called to grow in virtue, in turn 
growing in likeness of God, and this is how we walk the path to theōsis. Gregory also 
stresses suffering to imitate and participate in the obedient suffering of Christ which 
overcame the disobedience of the Fall. The fullness of deification is eschatological in both 
theopoiēsis and theōsis. For Athanasius at the eschaton deification is fully realised as we are 
resurrected and saved after Christ’s pattern. We enjoy some aspects of deification on earth, 
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but ultimately all the gifts are received at the end, when we shall become immortal and 
impassible. Likewise, for Gregory, while we continually grow in likeness of God on earth, it is 
at the eschaton that we shall be fully made like him through the power of Christ’s incarnate 
humanity. The heavenly state for Athanasius is characterised by participation in all the 
divine attributes as we are made gods by grace, transcending our nature. For Gregory our 
being made gods consists more in our complete knowledge of God and eternal heavenly 
contemplation of him, participating in this fundamentally divine activity. 
There are numerous similarities between these independently formed theologies of 
deification. Both Fathers root the realistic deification of humanity in the hypostatic union. 
Humans can only become gods, because God has been united with human nature through 
the person of Christ. Rather than focusing on the cross as the sole saving event, Athanasius 
and Gregory understand the whole of Christ’s life as redemptive, beginning at the 
incarnation and continuing through to the ascension. Deification is the combined work of 
the Son and Spirit in both theologies, with the Spirit realising individually what Christ has 
done in principle. While growing in likeness of God through virtue is given more attention in 
Gregory, this principle exists in Athanasius and morality in general is seen as essential for 
sustaining the deified state. Both Fathers also recognise the difficulty of doing good and 
avoiding sin as a consequence of the Fall and understand part of Christ’s redemptive work 
appropriated through the Spirit to be aiding humanity in their striving for goodness. 
Deification is for Athanasius and Gregory something which begins in this life and sees its 
completion and fulfilment at the eschaton. More generally the similarities of our Fathers’ 
ideas can be seen in the fact that they share the same basic structure, the one we have used 
to structure this study. Humanity’s created state and the Fall are key for both, as is the 
salvific nature of the incarnation; the appropriation of this salvation through baptism and 
the Spirit; the moral life of Christians, and finally the eschaton and our heavenly destiny. The 
greatest similarity is that both Fathers understand us to become gods and to be united with 
God when we are fully deified at the eschaton. 
Despite these similarities, our Fathers’ theologies of deification are significantly different. 
Anthropology pervades both fathers’ theologies, though they disagree in this area. For 
Athanasius, the natural state of humanity is fallen humanity, devoid of grace. His natural 
humanity is in a perpetual state of lack, constantly reliant upon grace and wholly other than 
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God. For Gregory, humanity’s natural state is the Edenic state, one not static, but of growth 
towards God. Humanity naturally possesses a nature akin to the divine. Consequently, for 
Athanasius, Christ brings humanity into a new static state, while for Gregory, he returns 
humanity to a state of growth towards God. Hence, Athanasius’ moral focus is on the 
perseveration of our deified state, while Gregory’s is on attaining it. God is the agent of 
deification for Athanasius and though not passive in the maintenance of deification, we are 
passive in its reception. For Gregory, deification is the combined work of humanity and God. 
We strive to become like God and rise to him, he comes down to us and completes the 
mystery by making us fully like him. The Fathers’ concepts of the deified state also differ 
dramatically, with Athanasius focusing on attributes and Gregory on activity. For Athanasius, 
we are gods, because we possess all the attributes of God, though this is by participation 
and transcending our nature, while God possesses these attributes naturally. For Gregory, 
we are gods, because we share in his activity. God is good and goodness flows from him, so 
too we shall be perfected in virtue so good will flow from us. God knows fully and 
contemplates himself eternally, so in heaven we too shall know and contemplate him. 
Ultimately, the start points differ; Christ’s redemptive work differs; the reasons for moral 
living differ, and the end points differ. Deification is not one uniform doctrine for Athanasius 
and Gregory. 
Perhaps the best approach to these theories of deification is to recognise them both as 
deification, but find a means of distinguishing between them. However, the realistic and 
moral labels are not the way to do so. The realistic label seems appropriate for Athanasius, 
since he does envision a transformation of the believer into a god in a realistic sense. 
Additionally, participation is the foundation for these ideas. However, to label Athanasius’ 
deification as realistic and not moral leads one to overlook the significant role morality plays 
in his system. Moral living, for Athanasius, is both the means of maintaining the grace of 
deification and the natural and appropriate response to receiving such grace. Without living 
morally one will not maintain the Spirit’s indwelling and will lose their deification. Turning to 
Gregory, to label his theōsis moral, but not realistic is untenable. Morality is a crucial aspect 
of Gregory’s deification and one does grow in likeness of God through imitating his 
goodness through virtue and good works. Yet, even if participation is not primarily the 
means in which Gregory expresses it, he does believe the believer will be realistically 
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transformed into a god and united with God through the power of Christ’s humanity at the 
eschaton. Gregory’s theōsis has both a moral component concerning growing in likeness of 
God through virtue and a realistic component concerning being more literally transformed 
into God’s likeness through sharing in Christ’s divinity. 
The limit of study is that we cannot fairly comment on whether a distinction truly exists 
between Cappadocian and Alexandrian deification, for this would require a consideration of 
all the Alexandrian and Cappadocian Fathers. However, with regards to Athanasius and 
Gregory of Nazianzus, we can confidently say there are significant areas of divergence 
between their approaches to deification and while both should rightly be considered 
deification, it is important to understand that these are distinct approaches. That is not to 
say they are wholly incompatible, but there are more significant differences here than 
simply different focuses. Perhaps in the quest to pin down a detailed definition of 
deification we might turn to the significant areas of commonality between the Fathers on 
this matter. Most fundamentally with Athanasius and Gregory, we see that deification 
involves the elevation of humanity to divine heights where they are united with God and 
made like him through the deified humanity of Christ and work of the Spirit within them. 
Turning to the Fathers we can hope to grow in understanding of this great mystery, but 
ultimately we will find disagreements and we will still have questions, for deification, along 
with all salvation, is a mystery. For “the achievements of the Saviour, resulting from His 
becoming man, are of such kind and number, that if one should wish to enumerate them, he 
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